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Services to Students 
 
Reading, Listening, & Viewing Assignments 
 
Written Assignments & Writing Essays 
 






Week : Introduction & Hermeneutics 
 
Week : Propositions & “What do you mean?” 
 
Week : Ethics & “The Ring of Gyges” 
 
Week : Ethics & Virtue 
 
Week : Ethics & Utilitarianism 
 
Week : Theology & Hope 
 
Week : Theology & Providence (General & Special) 
 
Week : Materialism & Commodity Fetishism 
 
Week : Materialism & Marx 
 
Week : Materialism & Political Economy 
 




Week : Existentialism & the Gift of Death 
 
Week : Ecology & the Green Knight 
 
Week : Ecology & the Non-human 
 







Course Description & Objectives 
 
 
The recent popularity of the film version of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings has 
renewed interest in this widely read work set in the realm of Middle-earth. A 
careful study of Tolkien’s work can be used to raise several philosophical 
questions, particularly in the area of ethics. This course will examine such 
questions, also considering topics from political philosophy, cosmology, and 
literary theory. Brief mention will be made of Tolkien’s colleague C.S. Lewis. 
 HUMN/PHIL  equips students for the critical exploration of 
ethics, epistemology, subjectivity, history, and theology. Through a series of 
essays and formal assignments, students will also improve their understanding 





Each Unit within the course will be presented through WebCampus. Students 
will have access to the Study Guide (this document) in a PDF format. Videos 
and Podcasts will only be available through WebCampus. Some of these video 
and audio materials will be required while others will be optional. Moreover, 
some have copyright secured by FDU or are available under Creative 
Commons licenses – these will be presented within WebCampus itself. Other 
materials are available to the public but have copyright held elsewhere, and 
these will be linked from within WebCampus. 
 Students are strongly encouraged to use the Discussion Board to post 
questions, especially when the course readings are confusing. While many 
students may already be familiar (or deeply engrossed in) Tolkien’s 
legendarium, the range of philosophical traditions and questions with which 
his work engages or that we will bring to Tolkien can be confusing. You are 
certain to face challenges during the course, and even seemingly simple 
questions may lead to unanswerable problems. By sharing your questions, you 
make your classmates more comfortable sharing their own questions as well. 
 Each Unit will be opened in WebCampus a week prior to its start 
date. Try to read ahead as best you can. 
  Services to Students 
 
 
Fairleigh Dickinson University’s Metropolitan, Florham, and Vancouver 
undergraduates, including Petrocelli College’s online learners, can make use of 
 
  
eTutoring.org, which provides free, professional, online tutoring in writing 
and other disciplines including math, statistics and accounting.  
Undergraduates can log in anytime and from anywhere! 
Metropolitan and Vancouver undergraduates can create an account 
using the instructions found in the left column to access the three tutoring 
options available: 
. The eWriting Lab where you can submit up to three drafts of the same 
paper to a tutor, ask for specific feedback, and receive a tutor's written 
response within forty-eight hours. 
. Live Tutoring (or eChat) where you meet online with a tutor in a one-
on-one, fully interactive, virtual online session. The subjects currently 
available are: 
a. Math (from the developmental level through Calc II) 
b. Accounting 
c. Biology (including Anatomy & Physiology) 
d. Chemistry 
e. Information Literacy (and Research Methods) 
f. Statistics 
. Offline eQuestions where you can leave a specific question (such as 
“how do I cite a DVD as a source?” or “can my thesis sentence be put 




. Go to eTutoring.org and click on the red “Login Now!” arrow. 
. A pop-up box will open; click on “Northeast Consortium” (because 
FDU’s main campus is located in the northeast region). 
. A drop-down list will appear; scroll down to Fairleigh Dickinson. 
When you click on FDU, our eTutoring home page will open. 
 
Logging in: 
. Your user name is your seven-digit, FDU student ID number. 
. Your password is your birth date in eight-digit format; for example, if 
you were born on April , , your password would be . 
. You will be asked to type your student ID twice more to confirm, and 
you will need to accept the terms of the site by checking the box and 
clicking the “Update Your Profile” bar at the bottom. 
 
 Reading, Listening, & Viewing Assignments 
 
 





Coursepack: HUMN  / PHIL , Fairleigh Dickinson University, . 
(in WebCampus) 
 
Bassham, Gregory and Eric Bronson. Eds. The Lord of the Rings and 
Philosophy, Open Court, . -. (in Ebook Central) 
 
Gifford, James. HUMN :  Philosophy of Middle-earth Study Guide. 
Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson U, . (in WebCampus) 
 
Tolkien, J.R.R. The Hobbit and the Lord of the Rings, Del Rey. . -
. 
 
NOTE: All readings except for The Hobbit and the three volumes of The Lord 
of the Rings are available via institutional subscriptions through WebCampus. 
You will be prompted for your email login to access library subscriptions. You 
may use other editions of Tolkien, but this is the least expensive set at present. 
Where possible, citations will include book and chapter information for 
students using other editions, but please note for used copies that there are 
distinct editions, and Tolkien revised The Hobbit twice after its first 
publication.   Written Assignments & Writing Essays 
 
 
In addition to the Discussion Board for each Course Unit and the final 
examination, your coursework will include two written essays and an 
annotated bibliography that demonstrates your capacity for academic research. 
Your essays should conform to the MLA Style Sheet (guides are available on 
WebCampus or in any standard writing guide book) and should have a level 
of correctness and creativity appropriate to an advanced writing course. 
 Please review the course syllabus or the “Assignments” section in 
WebCampus for detailed descriptions of each essay assignment and its 
deadline for submission. Each essay must be submitted in WebCampus 
through SafeAssign. Direct submission to your professor by email will not be 
accepted. Essays are evaluated based on the accuracy, clarity, and 
persuasiveness of the writing as well as their capacity to demonstrated 
completion and comprehension of the course materials. The capacity for 
creative thought and engagement in a critical dialogue are also important. 
 The Annotated Bibliography assignment can be used as preparation for 
your final essay. The Bibliography is evaluated based on your ability to provide 
 
  
a correct MLA Style citation for each entry, the grammatical correctness of 
each annotation that describes the scholarly work you have cited, and your 
demonstration of the ability to recognize the kind of work you are citing as 
well as its potential usefulness. 
 
 Writing Essays 
 
 
Your essays should conform to the MLA Style Sheet (guides available on 
WebCampus or in any standard writing guide book). Please submit all essays 
using Safe Assign in WebCampus using either the “.doc” or “.docx” MS 
Word format or the “.pdf” Adobe format. You can write your essay in any 
word processing program you like (Mac Pages, OpenOffice, MS Word, etc.), 
but submit the actual file saved as a “.doc,” “.docx,” or “.pdf” document. 
 
Essay Structure 
The specific outline for an essay will change depending on the topic, genre, 
and audience, but general guidelines are useful, especially as you shape your 
raw notes into a crafted argument. An essay is a holistic work, so it will not 
contain extraneous or unnecessary materials. You should make sure every 
sentence and paragraph counts and contributes to your purpose – if the 
relationship between an idea and your thesis is unclear, either cut the material 
or make the relationship clear. 
 
Introduction: 
. You must introduce the purpose and topic of your essay. 
. You should have a clear thesis. Typically, this is one sentence that 
states your purpose and intent, though it may be longer for some 
essays. Be as specific and direct as possible. While it is not graceful, 
“This essay does X, Y, and Z using R and S” is clear. 
. Do not rely on broad generalizations! While you might need to 
establish context for your introduction, cut all materials that do not 
directly relate to your purpose. 
. For shorter essays, you can introduce the specific points your essay 
discusses. 
. By the end of your introduction, your reader should know your 
purpose, how you will pursue your topic, and the general materials you 
will use or consider. 
 
Body: 
. Begin by sketching the order of the points you need to make (this may 
change). It may be useful to lay out quotations and references to 
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critical materials while sketching – if you are responding to other texts, 
this may clarify the sequence that your own argument will take. 
. While writing the body of your paper, be willing to change paragraph 
order. Each topic (which may cover more than one paragraph) should 
appear in the order that best supports your argument. 
. Only summarize in order to establish the background for your 
audience. Your paper is an argument and not a list. 
. Be sure to establish the relationship between paragraphs very clearly. If 
you cannot use “therefore” or “furthermore” to clearly demonstrate the 
development from one paragraph to the next, you have likely skipped a 
step or are moving into a topic that does not relate directly. 
. Ensure every paragraph relates clearly (not just implicitly) to the thesis. 
 
Conclusion: 
. You must summarize the purpose and topic of your essay, followed by 
a general sense of its significance or context (ie: restatement of your 
thesis followed by a conclusion). 
. Again, do not generalize. Be specific! If it does not relate to your 
thesis, cut it. 
 
Your conclusion should make sense of the preceding materials and give your 
reader a summary of what your paper has done, as well as offer a direct 
statement of the conclusion that your evidence leads you to. 
 
 Final Examination & Discussion Board 
 
 
The final examination for this course will be conducted as a viva voce exam 
(interview format) online through Skype, telephone, or other audio or video 
communications (this is subject to change) as well as face to face. Students 
must have access to either a telephone or computer system that supports audio/video 
conferencing or skype. The exam will consist of an oral defense of your final 
essay as well as a discussion of the course materials. Students are evaluated on 
three criteria ranked in order of importance: () demonstrated completion of 
the course of studies, () demonstrated understanding of the critical concepts 
of the course, and () the capacity for creative or innovative thought. 
 For each week, you will have an online Discussion Board to confirm 
your understanding of the key points. You may post your comments at any 
time across the week before the deadline (normally Sunday, midnight, at the 
end of the week). Each week will feature a starter post as a “Critical 
Summary” by a classmate for the philosophical text and the section of The Lord 
of the Rings that we are reading. Early completion is advisable. Discussion 
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Board postings and the Final Examination will cover both the primary readings 
as well as secondary lecture, video, and reading materials provided online 
through WebCampus, including this Study Guide.  
 
 Study Guide 
 
 
This course is designed to offer you an introduction to philosophical issues 
related to or helpful for approaching Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings. This 
means that we are reading Tolkien’s works as a literary text in its own right, 
not simply as a popular culture product helpful to understanding critical 
cultural theory, and in addition we are using Tolkien to introduce major 
trends in philosophy, in particular ethics. Each Unit covers one week in the 
course and a specific text or set of texts. You should read the Study Guide 
materials first then proceed to the primary texts, though you can certainly read 
ahead in the primary materials if you wish, unless the Study Guide directs you 
otherwise. Audio and video materials, as well as print materials, will be made 
available through WebCampus. 
 Recordings and videos of lecture materials or similar resources will be 
available through WebCampus or linked from WebCampus.  
 Each Unit (or week) will open in WebCampus the week before it 
begins and will offer a Study Guide chapter. The Study Guide will keep you 
on track, remind you of upcoming assignments, and will lead you through the 
difficulties of the readings. You may wish to keep the print copy in a binder, 
and an electronic version will be in WebCampus as well, including hyperlinks 
to explanatory materials in FDU’s Online Library resources. 
  







. Recognize our reading of any text as a hermeneutical activity. 
. Identify our textual “witness” for The Hobbit. 
. Relate hermeneutics to our unique position as specific readers. 








As we first approach an author like J.R.R. Tolkien, we must clarify our purpose. 
Taken together, The Hobbit and three books of The Lord of the Rings form one 
of the bestselling works of all time, and their adaptations to film are likewise 
among the highest grossing films of all time. In short, Tolkien is popular on a 
global scale, and a great many of the studies of Tolkien focus on a critical cul-
tural studies methodology that assumes the popular works of a given culture are 
valuable for understanding how commercial entertainment and cultural repro-
duction work and how they can elucidate culture itself. However, this is not to 
say that Tolkien’s works are merely popular pulp, forever excluded from the 
realms of “literature” or “art.” Tolkien was at the same time a respected philol-
ogist and Merton Professor of English Language at Merton College of the Uni-
versity of Oxford. His scholarly work included a study of the Old English poem 
Beowulf, a critical edition of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, and contributions 
to the stalwart professional journal The Year’s Work in English Studies (the author 
of this Study Guide has been contributor and chapter editors for the same pub-
lication for the past decade). In other words, Tolkien was also a scholar doing 
all the kinds of work you are familiar with in the university classroom, so his 
popular books are never distant from his professional scholarly concerns.  
 For our purposes in this course, we take Tolkien’s legendarium (the term 
he used for the mythical world he constructed across many published and un-
published texts) as a reflection of several philosophical traditions as well as a 
problem posed to philosophical movements he could not have anticipated. We 
as readers will seek a balance between Middle-earth as an emblem for the tastes 
and predilections of mainstream modern Western literary culture, Middle-earth 
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as a literary object of study, and Middle-earth as an entry point to philosophy. 
Tolkien’s Ring is clearly an intentional echo of Plato’s Republic, as we will see 
in Week . While intentionality would be less likely, the humorous puzzle Gan-
dalf sets Bilbo Baggins early in The Hobbit, “What do you mean?” (), opens 
for us the more formal issue of logical propositions in Week  –  what happens 
to our questions when we attend carefully to what our questions actually mean, 
or even more importantly, how they come to have (or not have) meaning? Fi-
nally, leaving Tolkien’s intentions entirely aside, we also turn to Materialism, 
Existentialism, and finally Green or Ecological Philosophy to ask how we might 
use Tolkien to better understand these ideas or to challenge our own biases. 
 As we read across The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings, we will look 
backward to works Tolkien may well have drawn on as inspiration for his work, 
and in doing so we will better understand Middle-earth as literature. However, 
we will also use Middle-earth as leverage to explore philosophical questions that 
are more urgent for our modern world than they could have been for Tolkien. 
 
Hermeneutics of The Hobbit 
 
The first two weeks of the course will cover The Hobbit. For Week , this is 
your only assigned reading. As a starting point, we should recognize that the 
text of The Hobbit has been subject to significant revision. Tolkien first wrote it 
without envisioning The Lord of the Rings as it would follow. For that matter, 
even the series was intended as a single book composed of six volumes, which 
the publisher insisted be published as a trilogy. Because of this, as Tolkien later 
wrote The Lord of the Rings, he suggested revisions to The Hobbit that the pub-
lisher integrated, and he then made further revisions again. He embarked on a 
major revision to the novel to bring it in line with the style and form of The 
Lord of the Rings but then abandoned this project. Because of this recursive bib-
liographical history, our approach to The Hobbit begins by simply asking which 
book we are actually reading? 
 Our assigned edition is the final textual state approved by Tolkien, not 
including his abandoned major revisions. As readers, which vision do we value 
most? The first, the final, or the intended? Do we trust an author’s plans prior 
to commercial success, or do we give more merit to his decisions after it? Is any 
version of the novel more “authentic” than any other, and is authenticity even a 
useful measure for literary works. We may do well to remember that Shake-
speare’s plays have a very confused textual history, and it is unlikely we have any 
in the final form Shakespeare himself would have intended (presuming he 
would even have been concerned with such a concept). However, keeping this 
in mind also means that our ethical concerns when Bilbo plays his riddling game 
with Gollum must confront Tolkien’s revisions. Did Bilbo lie? Was the riddling 
game even fair? Our answers depend on the version of the text we choose to 
read since they differ significantly (and ethically) depending on the copy we 
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have in our hands. If we are not aware of this, can we claim to be making an 
informed decision, or has the publisher (or bookstore clerk selling you the book) 
predetermining your choice for you? 
 Answering this question is a matter of “hermeneutics.” Hermeneutics is 
the study of textual interpretation, and as such it has a longstanding connection 
to religious texts and the interpretation of various scriptures. For example, with 
regard to the interpretation of Christian texts, a conflict has revolved around 
whether a text like the Bible must be interpreted only in relation to itself or in 
relation to its historical and social context. This may seem like a superficially 
simple problem to resolve, but it quickly leads to problems such as the intentions 
of an author and whether or not we may know them. In the case of religious 
texts, by asserting an interpretation based on intentions, is one claiming to know 
the mind of God? While Tolkien insisted that The Lord of the Rings was not an 
allegory for World War I and World War II, are we as readers wrong to place 
the books in their historical context and to read them in relation to the wars? 
Could Tolkien have been mistaken about his own books? Could he have been 
lying, like Bilbo originally did? Can any hermeneutics ignore “ontology” (the 
study of the nature of being)? Asked in another way, can we interpret anything 
without also locating ourselves in relation to it as readers? Does our situated 
position in relation to a text alter its meaning or interpretation? These are per-
haps too many questions, but they open up the complexity of our choices (often 
our unexamined choices) whenever we begin to interpret any text, from one of 
the best-sellers of all time to the back of a cereal box. 
Of course, in our case, the hermeneutics of Hobbits is further compli-
cated by Tolkien having left us with multiple textual states. Can an author 
change his or her mind? Do we trust original inspirations more than later emen-
dations? Is it wrong to read every textual state (each is a “witness”) that is avail-
able? Can a scholar “curate” a specific eclectic edition that combines various 
textual states (this is what we have for Shakespeare, for example)? Given the 
extent of Tolkien’s legendarium and the decades of posthumous publication of 
his various drafts, of which the  publication of The Silmarillion is the most 
important, we have make decisions to make about our process of interpretation. 
 In the first publication of The Hobbit from , when Bilbo wins the 
riddle-game with Gollum, the narrative voice tells us something specific: 
 
“Both wrong,” cried Bilbo very much relieved; and he jumped at 
once to his feet, put his back to the nearest wall, and held out his 
little sword. But funnily enough he need not have been alarmed. 
For one thing Gollum had learned long long ago was never, 
never, to cheat at the riddle-game, which is a sacred one and of 
immense antiquity. Also there was the sword. () 
 
The revised version of the text profoundly changes Gollum in a negative way to 
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construe him as more threatening than he had originally seemed and as dishon-
est in a way that the narrator originally denied: 
 
“Both wrong,” cried Bilbo very much relieved; and he jumped at 
once to his feet, put his back to the nearest wall, and held out his 
little sword. He knew, of course, that the riddle-game was sacred 
and of immense antiquity, and even wicked creatures were afraid 
to cheat when they played at it. But he felt he could not trust 
this slimy thing to keep any promise at a pinch. Any excuse 
would do for him to slide out of it. And after all that last question 
had not been a genuine riddle according to the ancient laws. (–
) 
 
How do we reconcile these major differences in the text? Tolkien, after all, 
wrote The Hobbit without knowing that The Lord of the Rings would eventually 
be written nor even what such a book might be, so his revisions to bring The 
Hobbit more into agreement with the subsequent epic adventures of Frodo 
could not have been any part of his original plan. In effect, he changed his mind, 
but this does not mean that we as readers must also do so. We are perfectly free 
to choose the edition we read and interpret. 
 This is then our first philosophical question. Do we expect fiction to be 
“authentic” or somehow real to itself? Do we have expectations we do not fully 
understand or recognize in ourselves (or that may even surprise us when we do 
finally recognize them)? Do we somehow better understand the “real” novel The 
Hobbit not by having a single instance or “witness” of it but by having all existing 
versions? If no such combined book actually exists (what we would call a diplo-
matic edition), are we inventing a metaphysical or unreal imaginary book by 
knowing the differences between the different editions as we read or by at some 
future date preparing a diplomatic edition for scholars and students. After all, 
diplomatic editions are foreign to Tolkien –  he had prepared his own scholar-





For our purposes in this course, which is neither a survey nor an introduction 
to philosophy as a discipline nor a specific reading of Tolkien through a single 
philosophical system, we will take “philosophy” at face value: the love of wis-
dom. Philosophy (φῐλοσοφῐ́ᾱ) is composed of two Greek words: “philia” mean-
ing love and “sophia” meaning wisdom. More specifically, “philia” is a form of 
love that is brotherly or dispassionate, as distinct from charitable, erotic, tender, 
or affectionate love. By the same turn, “sophia” means cleverness and wisdom, 
as distinct from knowledge, information, and mindfulness or even wit. For us, 
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philosophy is the love of wisdom, distinct from knowledge of specific bodies of 
information. Our key concerns will then come from our loving wisdom for the 
human condition and some of its perennial concerns that Tolkien explores in 
his novels: ethics (how we live with others), theology (how we contemplate the 
divine), materialism (how we are shaped by the forces around us), existentialism 
as a form of ontology (how we learn to be in the world), and finally ecology 
(how we live in our home).  
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
Please respond to any of these questions on the discussion board in WebCam-
pus. Remember, you have  point for your own comment and  point for re-
sponding to a classmate’s comment. 
 
. How would you personally define Philosophy? 
. How is philosophy different from other pursuits of knowledge, such as 
science or history? 
. Is The Lord of the Rings literature and why? 
. Which version of The Hobbit most interests you and why? 
. Is The Hobbit made any different by knowing Tolkien was a professor 
of the English language who did the same job as the faculty around you? 
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. Define propositions as distinct from ideas or puzzles. 
. Recognize the form of propositions, including obversion. 
. Describe propositions and puzzles in The Hobbit. 





Tolkien, J.R.R. The Hobbit. Del Rey, . (chapters –) 
 
Westphal, Jonathan. “The Nature of a Philosophical Proposition.” Philosophical 





This week we complete The Hobbit and begin to ask what philosophy is and 
what kind of propositions and questions it asks. Our attention is guided to care-
fulness over terminology, and the most obvious relationship to Tolkien is in 
Gandalf’s puzzling question for Bilbo, “What do you mean?” (). Westphal 
will offer us ways of encoding this query to better understand why Gandalf 
would pose this Socratic question to Bilbo. We will consider briefly some of the 
potential restatements of Bilbo’s proposition with particular attention to “ob-
version” as a way of removing what Westphal calls “puzzles” as distinct from 
genuine “problems.” 
 
Puzzles or Problems? 
 
Westphal’s chapter introduces us to logical approaches to philosophy based on 
propositions –  this is a starting point for us to distinguish between literature 
and philosophy. In a simplified sense, he presents philosophical problems as 
distinct from “puzzles,” which we will generally consider as literary matters ra-
ther than philosophical ones. This means that while we may have much atten-
tion and interest dedicated to a philosophical problem (ie: “What is the purpose 
of life?”), this is different from a puzzle that may be clarified simply by 
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restructuring or reorganizing the proposition itself without changing its logical 
meaning. The restructuring allows us to notice more readily the difference be-
tween an actual proposition and an idea. Our goal is to remove puzzles so that 
we may give our philosophical attention to the actual problems that merit sus-
tained attention –  in contrast, the puzzles are for Westphal merely misunder-
standings or are even without philosophical meaning due to poor expression or 
unclear purposes. While we may enjoy and value these puzzles, especially if they 
are literary, they are distinct from philosophical propositions. 
 In logic, Westphal is introducing us to inferences as a way of drawing 
out or eliminating a puzzle. His simplest example is “obversion.” Obversion is 
the repetition of a statement in negative (or positive) terms with the same log-
ical meaning –  “no trees are purple” in an obversion becomes “all trees are not 
purple.” Without actually interrogating the truth of this proposition, we are able 
to manipulate it through immediate inferences via obversion. The “converse” 
proposition would be another such immediate inference: “no purple things are 
trees.” Traditional logic is not our purpose in this course, but this gives us a 
starting point for distinguishing philosophy and literature in our readings. In 
effect, the elimination of a puzzle by inference gives us a way to approach Tol-
kien’s Gandalf. In Westphal’s argument, when a given statement is put through 
obversion or conversion, we can determine if it is a proposition or something 
else entirely. For instance, the opening line of The Fellowship of the Ring differs 
in its nature from the opening line of Peter Pan: “When Mr. Bilbo Baggins of 
Bag End announced that he would shortly be celebrating his eleventy-first 
birthday with a party of special magnificence, there was much talk and excite-
ment in Hobbiton” (Tolkien ) versus “All children, except one, grow up” (Bar-
rie ) If you try to write the obversion of each, you will have a very different 
experience. 
 
“What do you mean?” 
 
In The Hobbit, Gandalf is greeted by Bilbo with the courtesy of “Good morning” 
(). Gandalf’s response my seem humorous but is also at the heart of this kind 
of philosophical enquiry: 
 
“What do you mean? Do you wish me a good morning, or mean 
that it is a good morning whether I want it or not; or that you 
feel good this morning; or that it is a morning to be good on?” 
() 
 
These riddles repeat across the novel, but Gandalf’s quick query is followed by 
Bilbo’s wishing him a “Good morning” meaning that the conversation is fin-
ished and he wished that Gandalf would move along and be gone (). This is a 
plurisignification. Literary texts may find their actual meaning by holding 
  
several meanings at the same time, and a literary meaning may hold contradic-
tory meanings as both necessary. Philosophy is concerned with very different 
kinds of meanings, and in this sense, a literary truth may have nothing to do 
with a philosophical proof –  they are not of the same category. Confusing them 
would be a “puzzle.” 
 The query from Gandalf “What do you mean?” seeks to resolve such a 
puzzle. It is unlikely that Bilbo means all of these things at the same time, so 
his is not a fully literary meaning rich in multiple interpretations, so Gandalf 
treats it as a proposition that can be clarified by the kinds of restatements West-
phal models for us. Nonetheless, this is precisely what Bilbo claims when he 
answers Gandalf “‘All of them at once’” (). In literary terms, we would use the 
poet John Keats’s term “negative capability” as an example of a poet’s ability to 
dwell in ambiguities and plurisignification, such as the opening of his poem 
“Ode on a Grecian Urn”: “Thou still unravished bride of quietness” (Keats ). 
For Keats, the word “still” holds multiple meanings, such as “not yet” or “not 
moving.” The image of the bride on the urn is both unmoving and not yet rav-
ished, and “negative capability” of the reader to hold both (or more) meanings 
at the same time is an essential trait to poetic reading. The literary purpose is to 
hold both meanings together in the mind at the same time. Gandalf, however, 
seeks the logical clarification, which is a different purpose. In this, we have two 
forms of meaning: the literary and the philosophical. For Westphal, if we can-
not put a given statement through a process of obversion (or other logical trans-
formations), then we can set it aside as unrelated to philosophical meaning. 
 For our concerns, if we take Gandalf as modelling philosophy, we see 
him as loving and pursuing wisdom and truth. We make no such mistake for 
Bilbo, for whom the truth of beauty is more relevant –  this is even Keats’s end-
ing his poem: “‘Beauty is truth, truth beauty, –  that is all / Ye know on earth, 
and all ye need to know.’” (). It is a rejection of philosophy for literature, 
which we see modelled in Bilbo. Where Gandalf would seek to resolve the plu-
risignification of Keats’ “still” in order to avoid a puzzle, Bilbo would revel in 
the ambiguity and forking paths of truths that emerge from it, as does Keats. 
We might illustrate it using Westphal like this: 
 
Good Morning! → Hello! 
↓ 
“Hello” is not a proposition, so philosophy is uninterested in it. 
 
Alternatively, we might say: 
 
Good Morning! → This is a good morning  
↓ 
This morning is not evil 
 
  
This second revision would clarify what “good” means (does it mean pleasant 
or does it mean the ethical good?). In the context of the coming adventure, the 
ethical goodness of the morning may be particularly important to Gandalf and 
Bilbo, and much more important than its pleasurableness. We might, also, from 
that clarification through obversion begin to query the difference between good 
and evil as well as how a human and a non-human designation of time such as 
“morning” could express an ethical value. We may perhaps mean that there is 
no evil occurring in this morning, and instead there is goodness happening 
somewhere, perhaps in Bilbo and Gandalf’s meeting each other, but that is 
moving into the more literary realm of puzzles rather than philosophy. Across 
the course, we will use both forms of analysis, the literary and the philosophical, 
but Westphal’s shorthand for clarification will help us to pay attention to which 




We learned last week about hermeneutics as the study of interpretation, in par-
ticular as the study of how we go about the activity of interpretation. We might 
further refine this as the branch of philosophy not necessarily concerned with 
knowledge itself (which is “epistemology”, as we will discuss later) but rather 
how the process of interpretation is practiced. This means we must recognize 
interpretation as a practice unto itself. In this week’s questions, by asking how 
we might parse the statement “Good morning,” we have engaged in an analytic 
hermeneutics. Analytic philosophy seeks to refine philosophical concerns to 
those things that are most properly philosophical rather than merely “puzzles,” 
as in the above section (the wish “Good morning” being outside the realm of 
the philosophy while the proposition “This morning is good” being open to 
inquiry, if we accept the vagueness of the word “good” as viable). However, 
hermeneutics in general as a branch of philosophy would be concerned with all 
of the possible ways of interpreting “Good morning,” not only those that con-
tain a philosophical proposition. Propositions may be tested by logic, and this 
is analytic philosophy’s domain. However, we should recognize that this is itself 
already a choice made about using one form of hermeneutics (analytic herme-
neutics). We will concern ourselves with choices at many points the course as 
well, beginning with ethics and eventually moving through determinism to au-
thenticity and existentialism. Later, we might consider how Nietzsche’s con-
cerns with truth might guide us to make a different choice than “I will interpret 
this using analytic hermeneutics.” Other options also exist, such as locating our-
selves as readers with particular habits of interpretation and particular uses of 
language. We would call this ontological hermeneutics –  “ontology” is the study 
of being, so ontological hermeneutics is the study of interpretation based on 
how we exist in the world as readers who interpret texts. Roy Howard loosely 
distinguishes between analytic and “Continental” (European) hermeneutics on 
  
this basis (Howard ), and this convenient distinction will also help was we 
move through different and conflicting philosophical traditions. When we 
reach Marx, for instance, we may be far more interested in the circumstances in 
which choices are made than their analytical truth. 
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
Please respond to any of these questions on the discussion board in WebCam-
pus. Remember, you have  point for your own comment and  point for re-
sponding to a classmate’s comment. Beginning this week, you will have two 
classmates initiating discussion by posting a “Critical Summary” that excerpts a 
few sentences from Tolkien and a few sentences from Westphal. 
 
. Does Bilbo actually mean anything at all when he says “Good morning!” 
to Gandalf? 
. Can literary and philosophical truths or meanings co-exist together? 
. Do Gandalf’s and Bilbo’s very different perspectives on the world man-
ifest at other points in the novel? 
. How and why are riddles important to The Hobbit, apart from their en-
tertainment value? 
. Is Bilbo and Gollum’s riddle game amenable to the same kind of analysis 
Gandalf brings to his questions? 
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. Recognize the ethical problem of power in Plato’s Republic. 
. Relate Tolkien’s Ring of Power to Plato’s ring of Gyges. 
. Describe ethical choices in Plato and Tolkien. 
. Identify and compare justice as a concept in both Tolkien and Plato 
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This week we begin our fellowship… We have our first primary philosophical 
text and we begin The Lord of the Rings with the first six chapters of The Fel-
lowship of the Ring. While most Tolkien readers already know about the rela-
tionship between Tolkien’s Ring and the ring of legends such as Der Niebe-
lunlied (the German Song of the Niebelung) that also was the basis for Wagner’s 
Ring Cycle operas, we are looking back further. Plato’s story of the ring of 




We are familiar with the simple phrase “Power corrupts, and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely.” This is the problem we encounter in Plato. The Republic is 
concerned repeatedly with power and how a community (the city state of 
  
Athens in this instance) can organize itself to best deal with the competing de-
mands of the group and the individual. Another often voiced query is “Who 
watches the watchmen?” The first phrase comes from the Roman poet Juvenal 
but is often seen as originating in Plato’s The Republic. However, they have dif-
ferent answers that reflect how we consider the second question. If power cor-
rupts, then those entrusted with defending power must also be corrupted by it. 
Plato suggests that the watchmen must be raised correctly and morally to be 
ethical in their souls. Juvenal is more cynical, although his context was guarding 
marital fidelity rather than the running of the state –  his implication, however, 
is that everyone is corruptible.  
 This is the problem we find in Plato’s tale of the ring. If the ring of 
Gyges can render whoever possesses it invisible, what force would constrain that 
individual from doing evil or acting selfishly? If justice itself, as a concept, does 
not supersede other interests, what can one do to respond to Glaucon’s assertion 
that there are many people who “think that justice is to be reckoned in the trou-
blesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and 
of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided” 
(Plato )? That is, how do we pursue justice in a society when members of that 
society regard justice as a tool or instrument for their person gain and not as a 
virtue unto itself? 
 To test this assertion, we are given the story of Gyges and his ring, 
which makes him invisible (Plato ). Glaucon asserts that if “there were two 
such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no 
man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in 
justice” (). In other words, the just and the unjust alike would turn to injustice. 
If there were to be no consequences, then all people of the world with abandon 
justice and commit crimes freely. Furthermore, for the unjust who bear such a 
ring, Glaucon further asserts that we cannot assume they would appear unjust 
but rather that they would present themselves to the world as the most just and 
ethical person possible (). The distinction, then, would be that the unjust 
would be happy in their crimes and the just would feel guilty yet still be criminal, 
and on the basis of happiness being the only difference, we should grant supe-
riority to the unjust. Justice itself is then merely a tool of society and not an end 
unto itself. The unjust will always be happier than the just. 
 Our excerpt ends at this point, although Plato does later tell us that the 
rewards of justice are more extensive, although he cannot bring Glaucon into 
agreement. Plato also makes recourse to the gods to make this argument, so his 
discussion of ethics eventually turns to a question of theology and metaphysics. 
However, since Tolkien does not include a clear sense of an afterlife in his Mid-
dle-earth, nor a clear vision of clergy, the holy, or of theological consequences, 
we must ask different questions in relation to The Fellowship of the Ring. For 
instance, if Gandalf will resurrect if he dies, as will Sauron, on what basis do 
they remain just or unjust in the world? If the elves, who are presented to us as 
  
readers as an ethical community, do not perish when their body dies but rather 
continue on in the world for all of eternity, on what basis do they find a benefit 
to justice rather than injustice? 
 
Bilbo Gives Up the Ring 
 
When Bilbo finally surrenders the Ring to Gandalf, for it to be transferred to 
Frodo, have we seen a victory of justice over injustice? Has Bilbo overcome the 
temptation of the Ring to do evil rather than good? When Bilbo offers Gandalf 
the Ring of power, we see Tolkien rehearsing an argument much akin to Glau-
con’s from Plato’s The Republic: 
 
“You are wise and powerful. Will you not take the Ring?” 
“No!” cried Gandalf, springing to his feet. “With that 
power I should have power too great and terrible. And over me 
the Ring would gain a power still greater and more deadly.” His 
eyes flashed and his face was lit as by a fire within. “Do not tempt 
me! For I do not wish to become like the Dark Lord himself. 
Yet the way of the Ring to my heart is by pity, pity for weakness 
and the desire of strength to do good. Do not tempt me! I dare 
not take it, not even to keep it safe, unused. The wish to wield it 
would be too great for my strength. I shall have such need of it. 
Great perils lie before me.” (Tolkien, Fellowship ) 
 
This is a new paradigm from Plato’s. Gandalf does not see himself as being 
corrupted by the desire for injustice or his yielding to the temptations of his 
desires, but rather precisely because his good ethical position would lead him to 
pursue the ethical good through the Ring’s power. This alters Plato’s argument 
by suggesting that even if the just believe that a theological view grants them 
greater happiness by being just and good, they would still be tempted by Gyges’s 
Ring because through exercising the power of the Ring they would interfere 
with the world with the intention of doing good but, by virtue of acting upon 
others through this power, would eventually commit evil. 
 Similar language recurs when Frodo holds the Ring. While he is in The 
Prancing Pony Inn, he experiences a temptation very much like Gandalf’s with 
the Ring: 
 
He felt the Ring on its chain, and quite unaccountably the desire 
came over him to slip it on and vanish out of the silly situation. 
It seemed to him, somehow, as if the suggestion came to him 
from outside, from someone or something in the room. He re-
sisted the temptation firmly, and clasped the Ring in his hand, 
as if to keep a hold on it and prevent it from escaping or doing 
  
any mischief. At any rate it gave him no inspiration. (Tolkien, 
Fellowship ) 
 
The language of “desire” and “temptation” should guide our interpretation here. 
We might also ask how we as readers are guided morally and ethically by read-
ing of how Frodo “resisted the temptation firmly.” Does this give us a model 
for ethical conduct that implicitly resists temptation and replaces it with reason 
and care? Furthermore, the Ring’s “suggestion” comes from outside of Frodo 
and even from outside of the room. Does this suggest that evil is external to 
people, who are intrinsically good? Is evil something that comes to us rather 
than being a part of us? This may reflect Tolkien’s religious faith, but it is also 
a central question for how we distinguish between Socrates and Glaucon or how 
we might imagine encouraging a society to support justice rather than injustice. 
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
Please respond to any of these questions on the discussion board in WebCam-
pus. Remember, you have  point for your own comment and  point for re-
sponding to a classmate’s comment. This week, you will have two classmates 
initiating discussion by posting a “Critical Summary” that excerpts a few sen-
tences from Tolkien and a few sentences from Plato and Katz. 
 
. Is Gandalf’s response to the Ring the same as Frodo’s, or are there dif-
ferences between them? 
. Whose argument, Socrates’s or Glaucon’s, do you support for justice? 
Why? 
. What might you offer today as an example of temptation akin to the 
Ring? 
. If temptation comes from “outside the room” and is external to Frodo 
(or Gandalf, or even us), are we actually unethical if it compels us to 
unethical actions? 
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. Distinguish between justice and virtue as concepts. 
. Recognize virtue in select characters in The Fellowship of the Ring. 
. Describe virtuousness in a character’s actions. 
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We continue from the question of justice in Plato’s The Republic, which is es-
sentially a social or community issue, to the individual problem of virtue. To be 
virtuous is a trait of a character or a person, whereas justice is a matter of concern 
for a community. I may remain virtuous even without a community, but justice 
only relates between the individual and the group. Skoble broaches the question 
of “virtue ethics” for us, and we will use this to compare and contrast the char-




In The Republic we encountered the Ring of Gyges and the temptation that any 
just person might experience when offered the freedom of action without con-
sequence. Glaucon has argued with Socrates that the only difference between 
the just and the unjust in such a situation is happiness—the unjust will be happy 
in their crimes while the just are not, but both will commit injustices when they 
have no consequences for their actions. This week, we turn to a distinct concept, 
“virtue,” to further elaborate our discussion so far. In a classical sense, there are 
three questions being raised, and each has a distinct term in Ancient Greek. For 
this reason, we find ethics are discussed differently among Ancient Greek 
  
philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle. We have “arete” (ἀρετή, meaning ex-
cellence or virtue as in our readings this week), “phronesis” (φρόνησῐς, meaning 
practical or moral wisdom closely related to “prudence”), and “eudaimonia” 
(εὐδαιμονία, meaning flourishing or happiness). The concept of eudaimonia is 
what Glaucon draws on to argue that the difference between the just and the 
unjust is happiness, since both will be tempted when offered Gyges’s ring of 
invisibility. We will later discuss this in relation to utilitarianism, which em-
phasizes the greater good or happiness in a consequentialist philosophy (good 
ness relates to consequences rather than any intrinsic value to an action). When 
we propose a theory of ethics based on virtue, it is through “arete,” for which 
the ethical value inheres in the character or state of persons themselves. 
 Aristotle, in distinction from Plato in his Socratic dialogues, emphasizes 
“arete” whereas Plato had presented virtue as arising from justice. Virtue, in 
Aristotle’s vision, is not merely derived from justice but expresses the essential 
nature of a human being or a human soul. A person who is unjust or evil but 
does a good deed is not miraculously virtuous by doing so—such as person has 
made a calculated decision, perhaps for justice, but not because they are them-
selves good. In contrast, a virtuous person does good deeds as an expression of 
their genuine being. They are good in their character and hence virtuous. For 
example, while Gollum may lead Bilbo out of the caves, he does not do so out 
of virtuousness (although the specific edition of the text may muddy our evalu-
ation of Gollum…). In contrast, Sam Gamgee is faithful to Frodo and helps 
him as a way of expressing his own essential virtuousness. In contrast, Glaucon, 
in our previous readings, appears to either dismiss or simply be uninterested in 
any concept of essential traits of character. 
 Virtue also has a long literary history. What we call “didactic fiction” 
(fiction aimed at teaching the reader) plays a large role in literature, and we can 
look to works such as Samuel Richardson’s Pamela; or, Virtue Rewarded or sen-
timental narratives such as Frederick Douglass’s Narrative of the Life of Frederick 
Douglass. For Pamela, there is a double meaning at work—the protagonist’s vir-
tue is both “virtuousness” and her virginity, which is an emblem for virtue. The 
purpose of the novel was to guide young men and women to a virtuous character 
by helping them to identify with the virtuous and dislike those who engage in 
vice or evil. This can be explicit in a literary work or implicit in its plot, such as 
when good things happen to good people and bad things happen to bad people. 
As the Irish author Oscar Wilde reminds us, this outcome is pure fiction… 
Pamela trains readers to be virtuous by telling them that virtue is rewarded and 
by modelling virtuous behavior as normal and superior. Frederick Douglass has 
a different model when he employs the traits of “sentimental fiction” in his nar-
rative. In this paradigm, he seeks to train the reader’s feelings and emotional 
responses, or what we call and education of the sentiments. This is intended to 
alter the reader’s virtue by coaching us to feel appropriate responses when good 
or bad things happen to those who are virtuous or evil. We feel sympathy when 
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the virtuous hero suffers, and we feel triumph when the evil villain is defeated. 
We find this in almost all narratives today, implicitly supporting the heroes and 
heroines in Harry Potter or disliking the villains in Star Wars. In both instances, 
we also see the virtuous eventually succeed and the evil eventually defeated, 
which reinforces the ethical and moral stance of the narrative. 
 
Place, People, & Virtue 
 
We have a great many instances of virtue and character in The Fellowship of the 
Ring, but Tolkien also makes it an essential trait of place. He reminds us that  
 
such was the virtue of the land of Rivendell that soon all fear and 
anxiety was lifted from their minds. The future, good or ill, was 
not forgotten, but ceased to have any power over the present. 
Health and hope grew strong in them, and they were content 
with each good day as it came, taking pleasure in every meal, and 
in every word and song. (Tolkien, Fellowship ) 
 
This underscores a critical component of virtue. It is intrinsic. Rivendell, which 
is a place rather than a character, cannot help but be what it is: virtuous. Nota-
bly, the virtue of Rivendell emphasizes this intrinsic quality to the goodness it 
bestows by denying or refuting other models of ethics. When Glaucon considers 
what course of action will bring about the greatest happiness in relation to 
Gyges’s ring, this is a “consequentialist” evaluation. The goodness or justice of 
an action is based on what it causes or leads to, not the intentions of whoever 
does it nor their feelings while committing the action. Not so for Rivendell. 
Rivendell dispels “the future” () so that all that is good proceeds from the 
present state of being. The essential virtue of a person or place is based on its 
being and not on the consequences of its actions. You can commit justice or in-
justice, but you must be virtuous or without virtue. The former is an activity 
while the latter is an ontological state of being. 
 With this being in our minds as an essential component of virtue, we 
can then consider our characters. How, for example, do we contrast Aragorn 
and Frodo when the Nazgûl attack them? Frodo experiences temptation to use 
the Ring and yields to it out of fright and desperation. Does this make him less 
virtuous than Aragorn, who defends him despite the dreadfulness of the 
Nazgûl? Frodo’s action endangers their quest, but is it an act of an unvirtuous 
person? More obviously, how might we contrast the being or essential traits of 
the Nazgûl themselves against Frodo, Aragorn, or Glorfindel? 
 For virtue, however, we likely have no better character study in The Lord 
of the Rings than the contrast between Gollum/Smeagol and Samwise Gamgee. 
Sam commits questionable actions, such as eavesdropping or spying on Frodo, 
but we regard this as ultimately an expression of his virtuousness. In contrast, 
  
Gollum may assist Bilbo in The Hobbit as we have seen, but this does little to 
secure a sense of his being a virtuous character whom we would wish to emulate. 
Lastly, we face a challenge for ourselves. How do we as readers recognize Tol-
kien’s didactic work in his legendarium and its attempts to teach us to be just 
and virtuous? Once we have recognized this didactic quality, we have a second 
challenge. How do we recognize when Tolkien seeks to train our emotional 
responses to the ethical conflicts his characters face? This entails recognizing 
Tolkien’s work as both didactic and sentimental. 
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
Please respond to any of these questions on the discussion board in WebCam-
pus. Remember, you have  point for your own comment and  point for re-
sponding to a classmate’s comment. This week, you will have two classmates 
initiating discussion by posting a “Critical Summary” that excerpts a few sen-
tences from Tolkien and a few sentences from Skoble. 
 
. Is there a difference in virtuousness between Frodo and Aragorn, even 
if there are different consequences for their actions? 
. What are the three Greek concepts for ethics, and how do they differ? 
. Why is justice related to what one does and virtue to what one is? What 
is the difference? 
. Does Tom Bombadil’s immunity to the Ring’s influence our interpre-
tation of his ethics? Would be do best to understand Tom Bombadil 
through his actions or his state of being? 
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. Define utilitarianism as an ethical philosophy. 
. Define deontology as an ethical philosophy. 
. Distinguish between essentialist and consequentialist theories of ethics. 
. Recognize ethical choices in The Fellowship of the Ring. 
. Identify the preponderance toward deontological or consequentialist 
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You may already have been introduced to utilitarianism through readings in the 
University Core across UNIV  and UNIV . The most overt consider-
ation of utilitarianism in these courses is Ursula K. Le Guin’s short story “The 
Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas,” which challenges readers over an ethical 
choice: to accept the suffering of others if it creates a greater good (consequen-
tialist ethics) or to reject such suffering even if doing so does not matter (essen-
tialist ethics). We have seen this contrast already through Plato and Aristotle in 
the concepts of justice and virtue. This week we continue on the Ring’s journey 
South by considering utilitarianism as an ethical model based on consequences 
that lead to the greatest good or happiness possible. You should read John Stu-
art Mill and then William James after completing this Study Guide chapter. 
 
Bentham, Mill, & Utilitarianism 
 
Jeremy Bentham (–) was a British reformer and philosopher with a 
  
wide range of influences on social reform, prison reform, law, and education. 
He contributed to the founding of University College London where his body 
famously remains on display (in  he visited New York City as a display in 
the Metropolitan Museum of Art). He is the modern founder of utilitarianism 
and was John Stuart Mill’s teacher. We are reading Mill’s refinement of Ben-
tham’s arguments for utilitarianism. 
 Mill (–) wrote Utilitarianism as a series of three articles for 
Fraser Magazine in . We are reading only the second chapter of the book, 
“What Utilitarianism Is,” in which Mill, from Bentham, argues for the principle 
of the greatest happiness as an ethical good. This should remind us of the dis-
tinction we found in Plato and Aristotle between virtue and justice. Virtue is an 
essentialist form of ethics based on a person’s character or being—in contrast, 
justice is a social and consequentialist form of ethics based on actions. Virtue 
requires a state of being while justice demands actions. Mill’s utilitarianism falls 
clearly on the consequentialist side of this paradigm and goes further by de-
manding that ethical choices not engage in a virtue ethics argument for deon-
tological ethics. “Deontology” is the understanding of ethics as based in the 
rightness or correctness of the choice or state of being unto itself, regardless of 
its consequences. Bentham used the term in a more limited sense to mean fol-
lowing a moral or legal code, whereby any permitted action or required action 
was itself already de facto ethical (Bentham –). Our modern sense of deon-
tology is, like virtue ethics, concerned with the rightness or ethical nature of a 
thing unto itself, distinct from a consequentialist concern with outcomes. Mill 
and Bentham base utilitarian ethics on the principle of the greatest happiness, 
and for this any ethical action is to be judged on a consequentialist basis. This 
also means that choices we might otherwise not regard as ethical, per se, are 
ethical concerns under a utilitarian paradigm. For example, a religious founda-
tion of ethics (essentialist) may not be concerned with a healthy diet, but a util-
itarian ethics (consequentialist) may be.  
This principle of the greatest happiness follows on the concept of eu-
daimonia discussed in the previous week. It is a paradigm distinct from virtue 
ethics. In many respects, we may simply regard utilitarianism as a further de-
velopment of theories of eudaimonia as an ethical philosophy. Our previous 
readings emphasized moral character and virtue as the pathways to ethical con-
duct, and hence to an ethical state of being. Prior to this, we also saw Glaucon 
arguing in The Republic that the only distinction between the just and the unjust 
is that the unjust are happier without their contribution to social justice being 
any different. Utilitarianism is distinct from both. We have in Mill and Ben-
tham an argument about social consequences and in which they grant those 
social consequences priority. Happiness is to be assessed for the community, 
not only the individual, and in an Epicurean sense. This gives a simple principle 
for evaluating all ethical choice: that which reduces suffering and produces hap-
piness is the greatest ethical good.  
On this basis, Bentham argued for a range of socially progressive issues 
ranging from ending animal cruelty to abolishing prohibitions on 
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homosexuality, all from the perspective of attaining the greatest happiness. On 
the same basis, he campaigned against cruel punishments in prison reform on 
the basis that the suffering did not lead to a greater increase in the community’s 
happiness. Many of these issues are alive and actively part of our civil discourse 
today. You may wish to compare various public figures and their positions on 
social reform based on whether they hold to deontological or utilitarian meth-
ods of evaluating ethics. 
For instance, prison education programs are proven to reduce recidi-
vism, which means it reduces the rate at which former prisoners reffend as well 
as the seriousness of subsequent offences (Vacca ). However, many people 
also feel that investing in free education for convicts is immoral. This is a clear 
conflict between ethical modes of thought: the deontological and the utilitarian. 
A deontological argument is made on one side that granting free education to 
criminals while law-abiding citizens must pay for education is immoral. The 
consequences may clearly benefit the community, and the reduction in crime 
may create far more fiscal savings than the cost of education programs, yet those 
holding to this deontological position regard it as immoral (note: others might 
also argue that educating criminals is an ethical good unto itself as charity). The 
utilitarian argument is based on the principle of the greatest happiness, in which 
the community has a greater level of happiness based on reducing crime rates 
as well as reducing the taxation necessary to keep criminals in prison—the ethics 
of free education for criminals while law-abiding citizens pay for education has 
no basis for evaluation unto itself, only in its consequences. 
 
James Against Utilitarianism 
 
William James (–) may already be familiar for having furnished the 
ethical dilemma of a suffering child whose pain grants great happiness to an 
entire community—this is the basis for Le Guin’s “The Ones Who Walk Away 
From Omelas,” which combines James’s thought experiment with Fyodor Dos-
toyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor from The Brothers Karamazov who argues that hu-
manity should not be granted free will since this would only permit evil to occur. 
Also, we are reading James for his thoughts on ethics, but he is primarily re-
garded as a philosopher for his contributions to epistemology (the study of the 
nature of knowledge) and pragmatism. Pragmatism sought to set aside concerns 
with absolutely truths by evaluating whether or not a question or its answer is 
of use. Hence, ethics should stray away from absolute statements and concern 
itself with actual demands that people face and must act upon. This is based on 
the problem of epistemological skepticism, which may be roughly expressed as 
the argument that humans can have no absolute truths without doubt, but at 
the same time we must accept some truths of which we are skeptical in order to 
make practical decisions in the real world. In a pragmatist paradigm, whether 
or not we regard something as “true” depends on the value we derive from it. 
Furthermore, while absolute truths may exist, we can never possibly know them 
with certainty, hence while we must adopt some things as true, we should also 
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always remains ready to abandon or revise these beliefs because all of our beliefs 
always contain at least some elements of error. 
James is not a utilitarian but is also not willing to cede to deontological 
thought the argument that an ethical good can stand entirely on its own, pre-
ceding the community as an absolute truth. Such an ethical good may exist, but 
we cannot possibly know it. James’s argument from a position of skepticism is 
that we cannot know any absolute ethical rules in a deontological sense since 
we have not run the full course of history to refine our culture’s ethical ideals. 
While we must adopt the ethical ideals of our day, we must also work to refine 
and improve upon them, and even revise them fundamentally when we find 
them lacking. Because we cannot know a true deontological ethical demand, for 
James, we must use a utilitarian method to find ever more refined truths.  
 James offers an abridged summary of his argument by claiming 
 
there are no absolute evils, and there are no non-moral goods; 
and the highest ethical life—however few may be called to bear 
its burdens—consists at all times in the breaking of rules which 
have grown too narrow for the actual case. There is but one un-
conditional commandment, which is that thou shalt seek inces-
santly, with fear and trembling, so to vote and to act as to bring 
about the very largest total universe of good which thou canst 
see. (James ). 
 
We must also pair this with James’s attempt to build a compromise between the 
deontological theory of ethics with the ontological concerns of virtue ethics with 
states of being. James closes his lecture, which formed the basis for the article 
we are reading, by returning to virtue ethics. He is specifically focused on how 
virtue ethics turns to utilitarian processes based on the skepticism that makes 
absolute ethical rules impossible to know. When compelled to make an ethical 
choice between good and evil, and specifically a choice so that we may continue 
to flourish in life,  
 
it is simply our character and total personal genius that are on 
trial; and if we invoke any so-called philosophy, our choice and 
use of that also are but revelations of our individual aptitude or 
incapacity for moral life. From this unsparing practical ordeal no 
professor’s lectures and no array of books can save us. The solv-
ing word for the learned and the unlearned man alike lies, in the 
last resort, in the dumb willingnesses and unwillingnesses of 
their interiors, and nowhere else. (James ) 
 
This closing may seem suspiciously close to virtue ethics, but given the problem 
of skepticism and the universality of some element of error in all of our beliefs, 
we have a subtle difference. His argument is that we must use a utilitarian pro-
cess to establish ethical rules that resemble a deontological position; however, 
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since we know that these rules will always include some degree of error and 
hence always be to some degree unethical, we must also continuously challenge 
and revise them. 
 
 Tolkien and Consequences 
 
Rosebury argues a clear situation of deontological and consequentialist ethics in 
The Lord of the Rings: 
 
When the Warden of the Houses of Healing laments the inju-
ries of war and hints at a criticism of the Gondorian élite, Éowyn 
replies that, “It takes but one foe to breed a war, not two, Master 
Warden… And those who have not swords can still die upon 
them” (RK , V, v, ). This implies, not a defence of revenge, 
but what moral philosophers call a “consequentialist” or utilitar-
ian argument: the total quantity of human suffering would have 
been just as great, or greater, if Gondor and Rohan had opted 
for non-resistance. It is a classic anti-pacifist argument, omitting 
only the implicit claim (which the reader can take for granted) 
that there is a chance of reducing total suffering if the aggressor 
can be defeated and future aggressors deterred. (Rosebury ). 
 
This is a consequentialist argument weighing not the ethics of the thing itself 
but rather the degree of happiness each pathway would produce.  
We see the same kind of thought at work in the conflict between Gan-
dalf and Saruman. Saruman, by assuming the triumph of Sauron, argues for 
joining with the Dark Lord with the hope of shaping his victory to reduce the 
harm it may bring and, over time, to use evil deeds to eventually turn to a greater 
good that would not otherwise be possible. This is clearly a consequentialist 
argument with a utilitarian ethic at work: 
 
“A new Power is rising. Against it the old allies and policies will 
not avail us at all. There is no hope left in Elves or dying 
Númenor. This then is one choice before you, before us. We 
may join with that Power. It would be wise, Gandalf. There is 
hope that way. Its victory is at hand; and there will be rich reward 
for those that aided it. As the Power grows, its proved friends 
will also grow; and the Wise, such as you and I, may with pa-
tience come at last to direct its courses, to control it. We can bide 
our time, we can keep our thoughts in our hearts, deploring 
maybe evils done by the way, but approving the high and ulti-
mate purpose: Knowledge, Rule, Order; all the things that we 
have so far striven in vain to accomplish, hindered rather than 
helped by our weak or idle friends. There need not be, there 
would not be, any real change in our designs, only in our means.” 
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(Tolkien, Fellowship ) 
 
Boromir echoes similar utilitarian values after he hears of Saruman’s treachery 
and imprisonment of Gandalf. Boromir argues during the Council of Elrond 
that they should use the Ring to defend themselves against Sauron: 
 
“Saruman is a traitor, but did he not have a glimpse of wisdom? 
Why do you speak ever of hiding and destroying? Why should 
we not think that the Great Ring has come into our hands to 
serve us in the very hour of need? Wielding it the Free Lords of 
the Free may surely defeat the Enemy. That is what he most 
fears, I deem.” (Tolkien, Fellowship ) 
 
Rather than answering their queries, we may as readers instead ask what form 
of ethics the novel teaches us. Like the sentimental novel that educates our feel-
ings and the didactic novel that teaches us virtue ethics, what form of thinking 
does Tolkien urge us toward? The answer may lie in the way that both Saruman 
and Boromir are corrupted by their utilitarian thinking. By witnessing their 
harm and destruction brought on by their reliance on utilitarianism, we may as 
readers be influenced to value a deontological position that is more in line with 
Tolkien’s Catholicism. 
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
Please respond to any of these questions on the discussion board in WebCam-
pus. Remember, you have  point for your own comment and  point for re-
sponding to a classmate’s comment. This week, you will have two classmates 
initiating discussion by posting a “Critical Summary” that excerpts a few sen-
tences from Tolkien and a few sentences from James and Mill. 
 
. What are the merits of Saruman’s utilitarian argument for minimizing 
the harm of Sauron’s victory? 
. How would you interpret Boromir using a utilitarian method? 
. Does James’s pragmatism revise the validity of Saruman’s utilitarian ar-
gument for joining with Sauron? 
. Do the elves and Gandalf embody a virtue ethics or a deontological eth-
ics? 
. Do the hobbits embody a virtue ethics or a deontological ethics? 
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. Define theology as a field of philosophical inquiry. 
. Identify different eschatological “endings” in theology. 
. Contrast the conflicting eschatological “endings” in Tolkien & his 
sources. 
. Identify ethical elements of Armageddon and Ragnarök as eschatologies 
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This week’s shift to theology (the study of the nature of the divine) also comes 
with a focus on endings. While we have not finished The Lord of the Rings, we 
may take the ending of The Fellowship of the Ring as our case study. We have in 
this ending something that feels far from “happy” or what we had expected. Part 
of the contrast of feelings is that we see Tolkien as a Catholic author invested 
in Christian eschatology (the study of endings, principally the end of the world), 
which most people assume should be a happy ending. In fiction and film, we 
certainly expect this. However, the book’s mythos derives largely from Scandi-
navian Pagan traditions, in which there is also an eschatological worldview cul-
minating in a form of Armageddon called Ragnarök. However, this Nordic es-
chatology is not a “happy” ending but rather a failure. How we combine these 
seemingly incompatible worldviews is part of our concern with theology. 
 
The Sense of an Ending 
 
Every narrative has an ending, whether it concludes or simply stops, just like 
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our own lives. How we understand and interpret those endings can be a key 
element of our hermeneutics (how we interpret). Does an ending affirm a pur-
pose or meaning to the narrative’s existence, or does it point to the futility of 
story-telling? Theology, as the study of divinity or of the nature of the divine, 
is often linked to endings. A key concern in most religious forms of thought is 
what happens after an ending. Are endings absolute? Does anything continue 
after an ending? If a narrative ends, does it cease to matter that it happened at 
all? Are our lives any different from narratives in this sense? 
 Tolkien was particularly concerned with endings, and Davenport re-
minds us that Tolkien focused extensively on endings in his famous essay Tree 
and Leaf. Tolkien coins the word “eucatastrophe” to describe fairy stories. The 
word is a portmanteau of the Greek word “Eu” for “good” and “catastrophe,” to 
suggest that some catastrophes may actually provide a happy ending that pro-
vides meaning and purpose. In this sense, the ending of The Fellowship of the 
Ring may be a “eucatastrophe” for the novel series. It is a failure but affirms the 
purpose of the quest and provides the characters with purpose and meaning. 
 With this focus on endings, we also have a sense of purpose or destiny. 
We should also keep a helpful limitation on this first week dedicated to Theol-
ogy: we are approaching the topic as an academic area of study. For example, as 
with Religious Studies as an academic discipline, the Philosophy of Religion is 
not necessarily related to religious faith itself, just as the Philosophy of Science 
is not itself a scientific field of study. Our interest is in a philosophical consid-
eration of how people engage in religious thought or contemplate the divine. 
 
The Völsunga Saga & the Nibelungenlied 
 
Much has been written about Tolkien’s sources for The Lord of the Rings, which 
range from the Norse sagas to Medieval Germanic texts and the modern col-
lection of Finnish folktales The Kalevala (Tolley –; Hunter ). Each of 
these reflects specific traditions. The Kalevala, for example, is a collection of 
largely pagan folktales drawn together during the Russian Empire’s coloniza-
tion of Finland. Hence, The Kalevala is a pagan text from a Christian commu-
nity that expresses a profoundly nationalist ethos for its independence move-
ment. It is deeply political and engaged with conflicting theologies. Similarly, 
both the Norse and Germanic sources on which Tolkien draws reflect the ten-
sion between pagan traditions and the Christian period during which they were 
written.  
 This overlapping of traditions may strike modern readers as unusual, but 
it should not. In the English language, we still have much of this history visible 
to us. Our days of the week, for example, come from the same Norse traditions, 
and any speaker of a Scandinavian language can quickly identify Monday as 
Moon-day; Tuesday as Týr’s day (a god in the Poetic Edda, to which Tolkien 
refers); the gods Woden/Oden, Thor, and Frigg as Wednesday through Friday 
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respectively; the Roman god Saturn; and Sun-day. We, as English speakers, are 
still awash in paganism that lingers on in our everyday speech and customs de-
spite the end of pagan theologies long ago. 
 We also know that Tolkien was fully aware of this pagan legacy in the 
modern English language and even the pre-Christian or “heathen” and pagan 
legacies that live on in contemporary Christianity. We also know that he was 
aware of it even in his own Catholic faith and in the English language. John R. 
Holmes elucidates how these overlapping theologies become entangled closely 
with the language of religious faith: 
 
The other word that Blackburn cites as merely a gloss for ‘God’ 
is metod. But as Tolkien suggest in [his] lecture [Tree and 
Leaf]…, the word has a heathen past not often recognized even 
by Old English scholars. The literal meaning of the word, ‘meas-
urer,’ suggests the Judeo-Christian creator-god, described in 
Genesis…. Tolkien mapped the trajectory of the English word’s 
pre-Christian meaning in his notes to Bede’s account of Caed-
mon. From the idea of ‘measure,’ it comes to refer to ‘personal 
providence’ (that which is measured out to the individual), i.e., 
fate. (Holmes ) 
 
Holmes adds further detail to this,  
 
To Tolkien, however, the most remarkable thing about the lay-
ering of Christian upon heathen in religious words is the very 
fact that the heathen words survived in English. Although many 
ecclesial words in modern English (including the word ‘eccle-
sial’) are borrowed from Greek (church, eucharist) or Latin (al-
tar, communion), Tolkien notes that most common religious 
terms carried over from pagan associations rather than using new 
words for new things. (Holmes ) 
 
To further this point, Holmes quotes Tolkien directly on these etymologies. 
Tolkien’s own comments in Tree and Leaf also show how closely he considered 
the pagan elements of the language of Old English as living on in the Christian 
traditions of modern English:  
 
It is remarkable how many of the primary words of the Christian 
religion were in Germanic, but especially in Old English (the 
earliest after Gothic to be Christianized) of nature, and therefore 
ultimately ‘heathen’ origin. In [Old English] the words for God, 
heaven, hell, sin, redeemer, savior, cross, paradise, Easter, Lent, 
holy, saint, eucharist, baptism, and so on, are all native [god, 
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heofon, hell, syn, Aliesend (Hœlend), Neregend, rōd (gealga), ne-
orxanwwang, Eastor, Lencten, hœlig, halga, hūsl, fulwith, etc.]” 
(Tolkien, Tree and Leaf ). 
 
For our purposes in this course, this recognition is remarkable. It means that 
literally we live in a modern world (and for Tolkien a predominantly Christian 
world) in which the days of the week are still named for pagan deities and our 
words for “God” and “holy” are literally the pagan pre-Christian Old English 
words “god” and “hœlig.” 
 Tolkien came to much of this material through his scholarly work on 
Old English and the history of the English language, and in particular his work 
on the Old English epic poem Beowulf. As with The Kalevala’s connection to 
contemporary political life in Finland (despite being a collection of folk mate-
rials partly written to establish a national literature), Tolkien’s readings are also 
connected to more contemporary movements. He first read the Völsunga Saga 
in the English translation by William Morris and Eiríkur Magnússon (), 
which presaged Morris’s fantasy novels that directly influenced Tolkien. Mor-
ris’s novels The Wood Beyond the World () and The Well at the World’s End 
() both draw on the Norse epics to write new narratives set in fantasy 
worlds, but they also reflect his activist work and his founding of the Socialist 
League in . For Morris, the recuperation of myth was intimately connected 
with his profound contribution to the Arts & Crafts Movement that preserved 
traditional craft skills that had declining with industrialization. You can envi-
sion this as deeply bound up with Morris’s work on labor rights and the condi-
tions of labor under industrial capitalism. 
 When the same Norse influences manifested in Tolkien’s contemporary 
Poul Anderson, it led to the less Christian and more Nordic novel The Broken 
Sword (), published just prior to The Fellowship of the Ring in the same 
year. Anderson’s use of the same materials emphasizes the darker failure in the 
concept of Ragnarök, which is not a happy ending. For the Norse vision of the 
world’s end, failure rather than success dominates the story. Comparing Tolkien 
and Anderson makes this difference more visible and thereby shows how Tol-
kien subverted his source materials to impose a Christian eschatology. In An-
derson, the heroes are impure and corrupt, and the world eventually fails. Ra-
ther than understanding our world as a temporary stage of history before a per-
fect triumph that ends the world, the Norse mythology casts the world as a 
temporary existence before chaos returns and the creation of the gods comes to 
its inevitable end. We read profoundly different endings. 
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
Please respond to any of these questions on the discussion board in WebCam-
pus. Remember, you have  point for your own comment and  point for 
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responding to a classmate’s comment. This week, you will have two classmates 
initiating discussion by posting a “Critical Summary” that excerpts a few sen-
tences from Tolkien and a few sentences from Davenport. 
 
. Does the ending of The Fellowship of the Ring relate more to a pagan or 
Christian mythological paradigm? 
. Does the ending of The Hobbit relate more to a pagan or Christian 
mythological paradigm? 
. The reception and use of Tolkien’s source materials changed over time, 
such as The Kalevala. How has the reception of Tolkien’s work changed 
since it was published? What do his endings mean for us today? 
. Are happy endings an ethical necessity? 
. Does the shift from Ragnarök to Armageddon, leave traces of a conflict 
in Tolkien’s novels? Do you see similar conflicts around us today? 
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. Distinguish between providence and determinism as concepts. 
. Relate providence to ethics in The Two Towers. 
. Compare providence to utilitarian ethics. 
. Identify providence as a theme in The Two Towers and The Fellowship 
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This week we complete our course section on theology in The Lord of the Rings 
through the concept of providence. As with our discussion of eschatology, we 
will find that Tolkien complicates any easy reading. A key theme for providence 
in Tolkien is distinguishing it from the mainstream concept of “Fate.” General 
providence is the interpretation of the world as expressing God’s intentions, 
which is to say that the world was created to unfold along a plan predetermined 
by God as an omnipotent and omniscient creator. Such a world does not require 
any divine interventions to solve problems or right wrongs since everything is 
already according to providence. Special providence is distinct and marks an 
intervention in the world or in relation to the individual. Miracles and, some 
might argue, even Christianity itself, can be sometimes seen as falling under 
Special providence, although not all theologians are in agreement on such in-
terpretations. Regardless, providence is a theological concept and reflects a way 
of understanding the world based in the contemplation of the divine. After 
Spring Recess, we will turn from the theological to the materialist, which will 
be a profound shift in our approach to Tolkien and to philosophy. 
 
  
According to Plan… 
 
William Dowie argues that “certain ontological implications in The Lord of the 
Rings also belong to… [the] Christian tradition. These include notions of fel-
lowship, kingship, providence, prophecy, prohibition, festivity, and eucatastro-
phe” (). Colin Gunton links Tolkien’s novels to providential history (–
), as Paul Kerry has noted (). Whichever way we approach The Lord of the 
Rings, the concept of providence and purpose is everywhere in the text for us to 
consider. Thomas Hibbs’s chapter gives particular attention to Gollum in this 
respect, making the specifically Christian argument that good may come from 
evil (and hence the rationale for evil in a world made by a perfect and good 
God). The best example of evil leading to good may be how Gollum comes to 
serve a purpose in the unfolding of history in Middle-earth (fulfilling Gandalf’s 
suspicions). The opposite, of good leading to evil, is regarded as impossible in 
this model of providence, and Kerry specifically argues this in his approach to 
reading Tolkien. 
We find throughout Tolkien a Christian and specifically Catholic ethos, 
just as his colleague and friend C.S. Lewis made his Chronicles of Narnia a clearly 
Christian allegory. For Gunnar Urang,  
 
The Lord of the Rings, although it contains no ‘God,’ no ‘Christ,’ 
and no ‘Christians,’ embodies much of Tolkien’s ‘real religion’ 
and is a profoundly Christian work. Tolkien requires no ‘God’ 
in this story; it is enough that he suggests in it the kind of pattern 
in history which the Christian tradition has ascribed to the prov-
idence of God” (Urang ) 
 
Nils Ivar Agøy argues something similar to Urang, but distinct in that he thinks 
the expectation of a clear statement of providence is unreasonable. In his ap-
proach,  
 
divine providence as such does not form the basis of specific ac-
tions for characters in The Lord of the Rings. But should we ex-
pect it to? The basis for ‘correct’ action in that book is quite ex-
plicitly a set of nonnegotiable moral norms (incidentally coin-
ciding with the ones Tolkien the Catholic believed to be univer-
sally valid). (Agøy )  
 
To this Agøy adds the observation that “‘Good and ills have not changed since 
yesteryear,’ as Aragorn tells Éomer, ‘nor are they one thing among Elves and 
Dwarves, and another among Men.’” (Agøy ). This is an argument for deon-
tological ethics. For both Urang and Agøy, then, we see the ties to providence 
as deeply connected with our previous discussion of ethics. 
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Chance or Providence? 
 
Hibbs details providential concepts in The Lord of the Rings as the primary con-
cern in his chapter, and we see his attention to how good may emerge from 
what appears to be evil, eventually, in order to bring about the eschatological 
“happy ending” we have already discussed. According to Hibbs, 
 
providence first appears under the guise of chance, of seemingly 
fortuitous events that turn the tide for good and against evil. 
These events, which often bring good out of intended evil, occur 
contrary to the will or at least outside of the intention of those 
who cause them. But providence is more than simply one or 
more fortuitous events; it involves the orchestration of an entire 
sequence of events; whatever glimmer we have of the workings 
of providence can generally be seen only in hindsight, the dis-
cernment of an order or intelligibility in what initially appeared 
to be merely a sequence of chance events. (Hibbs ) 
 
In this, he expresses a profoundly theological belief in a divine Creator who has 
set the universe in motion in order to achieve a plan. Hence, we may think that 
the unfolding of history (as modelled in the novels of The Lord of the Rings) is 
deeply religious in nature. This would mean that consequences are a reflection 
of providence and express the divine, eventually, as good emerges from evil. 
 Hibbs also breaks down this sequence of events that appear to be chance 
but reveal, to a theological interpretation, a guiding plan that is inevitable. 
 
First, the role of chance; Bilbo did not enter the cave looking for 
the Ring, yet he ends up leaving with it. Second, at least accord-
ing to Gandalf, the Ring itself left Gollum in an attempt to re-
turn to its master, but its will was thwarted by the chance arrival 
of Bilbo. This implies for Gandalf the workings of some other, 
perhaps higher, power, “beyond any design of the Ring-maker” 
(FR, p. ). Third, what appears to be chance allows for the pos-
sibility that good may now be brought out of evil. Gandalf pre-
dicts that the malicious and deceptive Gollum may yet have an 
important role to play in the events unfolding. He observes that 
not even the wise know all ends. Thus, fourth, whether and pre-
cisely how things will turn out remains unclear until the end of 
the entire drama. (Hibbs ) 
 
To make this point, that the books do not depict chance but rather show prov-
idence at work, Hibbs then quotes from Gandalf: “‘I can put it no plainer than 
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by saying that Bilbo was meant to find the Ring, and not by its maker…” (FR, 
p. ).” (Hibbs ). Said simply, the Ring has its own intentions, as does 
Sauron, but those evil intentions themselves already exist within a divine prov-
idence that will draw good out from evil. This is a direction for history. Just as 
the second law of thermodynamics defines the forward flow of time by the in-
crease in entropy for any given system, in this theological framework the emer-
gence of good from evil defines the forward motion of history. We should also 
recognize this in contrast to the materialist theory of history we will see in the 
next unit. We can call this direction for history a “teleology” or “teleological.” 
Teleology is a way of explaining things based on their purpose or end. For es-
chatology, the purpose of the world is its climax or ending, or for The Lord of 
the Rings, the teleology of Gollum is his role in the climax of The Return of the 
King. These purposes can be either extrinsic (coming from outside of the thing, 
typically meaning they are imposed by human demands) or intrinsic (of the very 
nature of the thing itself). Theology frequently relies on intrinsic teleologies, 
and providence is a good example of this. In contrast, scientific analysis is ex-
clusively concerned with extrinsic teleology that sees purpose as a human crea-
tion (ie: the purpose of evolution and natural selection may appear to lead us to 
intrinsic things like “dogs grew fur to stay warm” even though the scientific 
explanation would see such an explanation as human-created and not genuine, 
instead preferring extrinsic explanations such as “dogs that grew fur stayed 
warm and hence outbred other dogs”). 
 The eschatological ending with the triumph of good is then the ultimate 
example of providence in Tolkien’s work and its teleological sense of purpose 
and design, although Hibbs also notes that “the mysterious, incomprehensible 
designs of providence underscore the importance of human effort, a sense that, 
in spite of the apparent odds, one must press on to do one’s duty in the fight 
against evil” (Hibbs ). This is an important feature showing the importance 
of individual contributions to the fulfillment of providence. Hence, providence 
may be inevitable yet requires effort to achieve, just as one must (in this para-
digm) work hard to prevent the impossible from occurring. This same question 
of the impossible and the inevitable will return in our next unit as well. How-
ever, according to Hibbs’s argument, 
 
Tolkien underscores the role of providence in bringing about the 
fulfillment of the Quest not only through Gollum’s role but also 
through Frodo’s succumbing to the power of the Ring at the last 
moment. Concerning Frodo’s “failure” at the Crack of Doom, 
Tolkien writes, Frodo had done what he could and spent himself 
completely (as an instrument of divine Providence) and had pro-
duced a situation in which the object of his quest could be 
achieved. His humility (with which he began) and his sufferings 
were justly rewarded by the highest honour; and his exercise of 
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patience and mercy towards Gollum gained him Mercy: his fail-
ure was redressed. (Hibbs ) 
 
This is perhaps the most explicitly religious sentiment in The Lord of the Rings 
and the most overt show of Tolkien’s faith. Failure, evil, and chance combine 
to bring about the eschatological “happy ending” and end of the Third Age and 
provide a teleology for the history of Middle-earth. However, as with all teleo-
logical thought concerning history and the direction of historical growth, we 
must ask ourselves to what degree our impression of a purpose and design mov-
ing toward a specific ending are constructed by ourselves, by the nature of nar-
rative itself (or any form of storytelling), or are intrinsic to the world. Can we 
even imagine an extrinsic teleology for Tolkien? 
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
Please respond to any of these questions on the discussion board in WebCam-
pus. Remember, you have  point for your own comment and  point for re-
sponding to a classmate’s comment. This week, you will have two classmates 
initiating discussion by posting a “Critical Summary” that excerpts a few sen-
tences from Tolkien and a few sentences from Hibbs. 
 
. How does the concept of providence differ from chance or fate? 
. Is providence necessarily eschatological? 
. Is Gandalf’s “resurrection” a miracle or form of special providence, or is 
it something different in Tolkien’s legendarium? 
. How is providence teleological? What is an example of teleology in The 
Two Towers? 
. Is the teleology of Gollum intrinsic or extrinsic? 
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. Distinguish between Freud’s and Marx’s meaning for “fetish.” 
. Recognize substitution as a form of “perversion” for Freud and Marx. 
. Describe substitutes or objects as substitutes in The Lord of the Rings. 
. Identify commodities and money in The Lord of the Rings and describe 
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This week we move into ideas from Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx to ask how 
the Ring works as a substitution. For Freud, this is the process of “substitutive 
gratification” by which something desired becomes embodied in a replacement, 
such as an object standing in for victory (a child’s toy sword may substitute for 
actually winning at something, or a trophy may substitute for actual victory, and 
so forth). We may even, over time, come to value these substitutes more than 
the original things that they initially represented but have come to replace. Marx 
may contradict Freud, but he is also concerned with substitutions, such as 
money for a physical asset with value, specifically the substitution of a commod-
ity for the labor that produced it, or the use of money to remove a “surplus value” 
from a commodity or labor. One of our first challenges in reading Milbank’s 
article will be terminology, so we start here with definitions (you may wish to 
read the Study Guide first this week). 
 
Substitutions for Marx & Freud 
 
Our readings from Milbank puts ideas from Sigmund Freud into conversation 
with Karl Marx; however, not only did Freud and Marx never meet, their ideas 
are often understood as deeply conflicting with each other. FDU students for 
many years read Freud’s Civilization & its Discontents as part of the University 
Core. In that book, Freud sharply critiques Marxism for its economic 
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determinism. Despite this, several philosophers from Herbert Marcuse to Louis 
Althusser and Slavoj Žižek have attempted to develop a combination of Marx’s 
and Freud’s works, most often through Freud’s theory of fetishism set in con-
junction with Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism. These are mostly ways of 
reading Marx through Freud. In contrast, Fredric Jameson, who is mentioned 
later this week, attempts to bridge them by suggesting that Freud’s theory of 
psychoanalysis is itself a product of its historical and economic moment (ie: that 
it is an essentially bourgeois way of understanding the human mind and that its 
insights are merely expressions of turn of the century bourgeois capitalism in 
Freud’s Viennese society). Hence for Jameson, the concept of the unconscious 
in Freud is itself always already political and ideological, and we may historicize 
it as a product of an economic social structure of a specific place and time. 
 The first element is Freud’s theory of fetishism and the universality of 
perversion. These sound like startling ideas, but they are relatively common-
place. For example, in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (), Freud 
points out how human sexuality widely engages with substitutions for the pri-
mary biological function of desire: reproduction. He uses an extraordinarily an-
odyne and medical description to point out how “perverse” even the most com-
mon and acceptable parts of human sexuality can be. To do so, he describes 
kissing by saying 
 
contact between the mucous membranes of the lips of the two 
people concerned, is held in high sexual esteem among many 
nations…, in spite of the fact that the parts of the body involved 
do not form part of the sexual apparatus but constitute the en-
trance to the digestive tract. (Freud ) 
 
Freud’s point is to illustrate the “universality of perversion,” which is to say the 
majority of human sexuality and sexual desire is composed of various substitutes 
for actual sexual reproduction. Some of these substitutions are socially accepta-
ble and some are not, but they are all “perversions” of one kind or another. They 
all pervert the primary aim of reproduction. Simply put, kissing itself has noth-
ing to do with reproduction—as Freud points out, kissing involves digestive 
organs not sexual organs, yet we regard this specific perversion as completely 
normal. Furthermore, humans most typically “h[o]ld in high sexual esteem” 
these kinds of substitutes, often and perhaps even typically valuing them more 
(and finding them more desirable) than actual reproduction. 
 The project to bring Marx and Freud into conversation usually focusses 
on this process of substitution, just as money substitutes for value or commod-
ities for labor, so too may a “perversion” substitute for sexual reproduction. In 
both instances, we grant a seemingly “magical” surplus value to the fetish, taboo, 
or symbol that surpasses the value we grant to the original thing itself. Marx’s 
version of the “universality of perversion” comes in the “fetishistic” mistake of 
believing that value resides in a commodity (or even in money) and not in the 





For Marx, there are a wide variety of exchange patterns in a capitalist economic 
system that we need to understand in order to conceive of “commodity fetish-
ism.” These range from the following: 
 
• Commodity à Commodity  
• Commodity à Money à Commodity 
• Money à Commodity à Money 
 
The first is a barter exchange, such as trading baseball cards. The second is 
selling things one has made or acquired in order to purchase other different 
things one needs (you could sell your car in order to get the money you need to 
buy a bicycle and food). The third is using money to purchase something, like 
a vintage antique, that one then sells with the purpose of having increased one’s 
reserve of money itself. Value is accrued when you get more out than you put 
in, or when M (a sum of money) becomes M' (a larger sum) that we conceive 
as profit. We assume equivalence in exchange, such as Money for Commodity, 
but we may also speculate on future exchange value, or we may engage in arbi-
trage (the differences in value in different locations). The point is, in capitalism 
we seek to extract profit from these exchanges. A capitalist who does not will 
go bankrupt, and that forces history to move in a particular direction (this is a 
teleology, as we have already seen in the previous Unit on providence). Con-
sider, for instance, how you likely assume equivalence in barter, like trading 
baseball cards or swapping toys with a sibling –  contrast this to how you con-
ceive of selling a commodity for money or of selling your labor, both of which 
likely assume or at least seek profit rather than equivalence in the exchange. 
What creates that profit? Can equivalence and profit co-exist? 
Regardless of the manipulations of equivalence, for Marx only labor has 
the capacity to generate value. Everything else is smoke and mirrors. Modern 
economists have moved away from this approach, but it remains one of Marx’s 
integral philosophical assertions. Often, when critics wish to dismiss Marx, they 
point to this labor theory of value while surreptitiously avoiding the dialectical 
and conflict-oriented majority of his work (we will consider those next week, 
but Milbank discusses only commodity fetishism, so that is our starting point). 
In such a paradigm, commodities and money do not simply accrue value –  they 
rely on shifts to the society (“social formation”) that increase need or else they 
have value added through labor.  
The resulting error, Marx argues, occurs through “commodity fetish-
ism.” Commodity Fetishism occurs when people locate value in the commodity 
itself rather than the labor needed to produce the commodity, or worse still, we 
locate value in money itself rather than in labor. This fetishizes commodities 
(gold…) as substitutes for the labor that makes them. For example, we might 
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regard money as generating value rather than the labor for which it is ex-
changed. When Milbank regards the Ring as embodying commodity fetishism, 
this is what she means. The ring becomes the “precious” rather than a com-
modity created through labor. 
 
Objects & Fetishes in The Two Towers 
 
If we consider commodity fetishism as a process of substitution in which a sub-
stitute replaces its original, we have many suggestive objects to be found in The 
Two Towers. Milbank emphasizes the Ring itself in this regard, but the palantír 
as a magical object is initially a substitute for another’s power that eventually 
becomes its own distinct fetishized object unto itself. As a larger question about 
the ontological nature of fantasy as a genre, we might consider how magic (as a 
literary trope, not as trick or such) works in a process of substitution. Does 
magic necessarily dissipate the reality of labor? Is magic in this sense the ulti-
mate commodity fetish for Marx?  
Fredric Jameson has argued that, in a Marxist paradigm, magic defines 
fantasy as genre. He uses the term “romance” meaning the tradition we under-
stand as Arthurian Romances or magical stories that evolved into the genre we 
today call “fantasy.” By “romance” he means the literary mode of the Romance 
quests, not romantic as pertaining to strong emotions of the heart. Based on 
magic as the defining trait of fantasy, he argues that magic also defines the 
genre’s relationship to history, which makes fantasy reactionary and inherently 
conservative: 
 
It may, however, also be objected that there are other semantic 
codes in the romance which are equally as important as that of 
good and evil; in particular, it would seem that the role of magic 
as such is considerable, if not indeed constitutive. Yet the belief 
in good and evil is precisely a magical thought mode, that is, one 
which springs from a precapitalist, essentially agricultural way of 
life. It is difficult to imagine a conflict of magical forces which 
would not be marked in some way as positive and negative, or in 
other words, ultimately, as a struggle between good and evil, be-
tween white magic and black magic. Thus the two systems, that 
of good and evil, and that of magic, are inextricably intermin-
gled, and may indeed prove simply to be different dimensions of 
the same ideological phenomenon, that of Otherness directing 
our attention to the political and social attributes of such a world 
view, while the formulation in terms of magic rather orients us 
towards the economic organization of the society in question 
and the relations it entertains with the world of nature. (Jameson 
) 
 
Jameson’s prose is characteristically thick here, but his emphasis on history (as 
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will become more important over the next two weeks) ties fantasy to a pre-
modern world, or specifically to the transition from a religious to an aristocratic 
form of social organization, prior to the rise of a more trade-based society that 
reflects larger economic systems. His focus on magic stresses its religious para-
digm, from which he sees the concepts of good and evil emerging as ways of 
justifying the social structure. After all, the evil of social climbing from a work-
ing class to a literate class no longer strikes us as inherently “evil” today, and 
very likely as “good” –  it may even be your reason for taking this course… This 
means Jameson sees the terms “good” and “evil” as reflecting a historical condi-
tion, hence his directive to “historicize” everything.  
 Do the magic objects, which are plentiful in the closing of The Two 
Towers reflect this kind of worldview and thereby ideology? Is the palantír in-
herently bound up with ideological values of class, community, ethnicity, and 
faith by virtue of being magical? Is the labor or work done by these magical 
objects (without real people needing to sweat to produce commodities we fet-
ishize as having value) always ideological? Can magic ever drive readers to desire 
and work for a more equitable world, or does it always console us about the 
challenges we face and thereby prevent us from taking meaningful action to 
change things? How you answer such questions relates directly to process of 
substitution and “fetishes,” and hence the answers can tell you much about your 
assumptions and ways of thinking, not only about the answer or question. 
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
Please respond to any of these questions on the discussion board in WebCam-
pus. Remember, you have  point for your own comment and  point for re-
sponding to a classmate’s comment. This week, you will have two classmates 
initiating discussion by posting a “Critical Summary” that excerpts a few sen-
tences from Tolkien and a few sentences from Milbank. 
 
. If the Ring of power is made by Sauron and imbued with his power, has 
it replaced him? 
. Does magic, as a system at work in Tolkien’s books, work like a com-
modity fetish? Does it replace actual work? 
. Are there “symptomatic” substitutions at work in The Lord of the Rings? 
For instance, how to characters show their affection or love for each 
other? 
. Does fantasy, as a genre of fiction, necessarily aim backward toward a 
system of values and social organization that is pre-modern? 
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. Identify the historical context of The Communist Manifesto. 
. Define the methodologies behind The Communist Manifesto. 
. Distinguish between the Marxist concepts of historical materialism and 
dialectics. 




Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. “Proletarians & Communists,” translated by 
Samuel Moore, HUMN/PHIL : Philosophy of Middle-earth, edited 
by James Gifford, Fairleigh Dickinson University, , pp. –. 
 




To start with the text itself, there are many different versions of The Communist 
Manifesto available, and each tends to have its own complex history and pur-
pose. Identifying this historical specificity is also a very Marxist approach to a 
text. Our translation is the  edition on which Samuel Moore collaborated 
with Friedrich Engels, and this is often taken as the “standard edition” of the 
text in the English language. Nonetheless, it reflects its period and purpose. In 
relation to Tolkien, we will also ask how Marx’s attention to class, economic 
conditions, and culture and society as manifestations of material conditions may 
change our sense of Tolkien’s Middle-earth. How do we historicize a world that 
has never actually existed? What does “historicize” mean in this context? As 
Ishay Landa argues, contrary to our expectations, Tolkien “proposed to replace 
allegorical writing and reading with historical writing” (Landa ), a precisely 
Marxist configuration. Where C.S. Lewis relies on allegory, Tolkien abhors it, 
and “always historicize” is a signal Marxist phrase –  notably for us, the critic 
who coined it, Fredric Jameson, did so in his book The Political Unconscious, the 
central chapter of which originally closed on Tolkien and Lewis when it was 
first published as an article (Jameson, “Magical” ). We saw an excerpt from 
this article in the previous week, and its final form in his book removes its 
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comments on Tolkien, Lewis, and fantasy (Gifford ). Clearly we have much 
to discuss this week… 
 
Marx, Marxism, Marxist? 
 
Marx raises lukewarm eyebrows today… Marx’s historical context is a serious 
challenge for undergraduate students reading him for the first time today. As a 
simple example, when Marx makes comments on enslavement of workers, he 
meant this literally. His news writings in English for the New York Daily Trib-
une from – are, literally, against existing slavery in the United States 
of America before its abolition in . Factory working conditions in the Brit-
ish Empire are just as difficult for modern readers to appreciate without a con-
temporary guide book, such as Henry Mayhew’s London Labour & the London 
Poor from the same period as Marx. Instead, most readers come to Marx with 
the twentieth century Marxist revolutions in the Soviet Union and China in 
mind, and these are very different circumstances long after Marx’s death. As a 
philosopher, Marx’s works may seem very different to you from “Marxism.” 
 For our purposes, we are taking one small component of Marxist phi-
losophy related to history and ontology (being) and phenomenology. This week 
we focus on the historical component on its own. Marx wanted nothing less 
than a total overturning of the philosophy of history, and by and large, this did 
occur. For history, Marx argued that modern industry makes capitalism possible 
by virtue of urbanization and the centralization of populations into larger cities, 
which in turn allows for direct competition between workers and more indus-
trialized production. Note how this differs from the concepts of “Providence” 
and eschatological thought in a theological context. Marx’s history is entirely 
materialist, and while it may still be deterministic (as with any eschatology), it 
is based on a completely different, secular, materialist paradigm.  
In effect, as the wealthy middle class (the bourgeoisie) acquired power 
and displaced the rule of the aristocracy (those who had power and property by 
virtue of birth rather than economic success), a working class emerged (the pro-
letariat). This was a revolutionary change in society as wealth displaced social 
rank inherited by birth. Marx describes this change as “revolutionary” and casts 
the bourgeoisie as the most revolutionary class in history to date. To clarify this, 
“bourgeois” was not an insult, per se. It is just an incomplete stage of history to 
Marx’s perspective –  his own personal life was thoroughly bourgeois. In order 
for this commercial middle class to effectively compete in the market, it needed 
more efficient use of laborers who centralized in cities during the Industrial 
Revolution for factory work and the birth of wage labor. This new circumstance 
then gave laborers the potential for solidarity through unionization and revolu-
tion, based on their larger numbers. For Marx and Engels, 
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The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the 
bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to com-
petition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. 
The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from un-
der its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie pro-
duces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie, there-
fore, produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. (Marx & En-
gels, Communist ) 
 
This is a repeated component of Marx’s vision of the revolution: urbanized 
workers are no longer isolated and have the opportunity (and increasing pro-
pensity) for organization and solidarity with each other, and only thereby do 
they gain the potential for a meaningful revolutionary change. This is the un-
folding of a materialist history in which change occurs because of conflicts 
among material and economic forces (with culture, beliefs, and philosophy itself 
arising from those material conditions). Workers centralize due to capitalism, 
but they are able to organize and revolt due to the same centralization. Without 
urbanization and the industrialized production of goods, this centralization and 
radicalization of laborers is not possible. Just as the bourgeois revolution (mid-
dle class) arose from the pinnacle of aristocratic social organization (aristocrats 
could not work, based on social status, and hence needed merchants), Marx and 
Engels saw the workers revolution growing out of the successes of middle-class 
capitalism that concentrated and revolutionized the self-same workers. That is, 
Marx’s vision of social transformation was explicitly and necessarily an urban 
and industrial phenomenon. 
 A further unexpected description that repeats across the Manifesto is the 
bourgeois class’s revolutionary history in Marx’s and Engels’s views (the revo-
lutionary rise of middle-class mercantilism). Rather than being a universally de-
testable or somehow subhuman group, the Manifesto instead presents the bour-
geoisie (wealthy middle class) as having “played a most revolutionary part” and 
argues that “the bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end 
to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations” (Marx & Engels, Communist ). 
Even while calling for a further revolution to overturn the bourgeoisie by the 
proletariats, they still argue “feudal society fought its death battle with the then 
revolutionary bourgeoisie” (Marx & Engels, “Proletarians” ). In this sense, 
Marx and Engels see the wealthy, commercial middle class as having revolu-
tionized society.  
Hence, in their perspective, both the French Revolution and the Amer-
ican Revolution were bourgeois revolutions or revolutions of the middle class 
against those who would retain rule by an aristocratic bloodline. An alternative 
phrasing would be that the Aristocracy and Feudalism (hereditary kingship) 
were displaced by Liberalism (the bourgeois revolutions), which has remained 
the dominant political system ever since. The point for philosophy, however, is 
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Marx’s understanding of this historical process as the result of dialectical con-
flict between material and economic forces. It does not require a metaphysical 
approach to history with an eschatology, although some argue that the deter-
ministic elements of Marx’s argument are simply a new eschatology. For exam-
ple, if in our reading there is an inevitable conflict between workers and owners 
(and that conflict is a result of owners having toppled the previous hereditary 
rulers of their supremacy), that conflict would seem to bend in only one direc-




Several terms are used to describe Marx’s and Engels’s ideas, and they do not 
always define these terms while using them. Others exist only as themes in the 
Communist Manifesto and do not emerge as part of a Marxist lexicon or jargon 
until later as Marx’s ideas developed more fully. 
“Historical materialism” is sometimes called “dialectical materialism,” 
through Marx never used the term. It is important to keep in mind that histor-
ical materialism is a method more than a particular answer or outcome. It does 
not tell the future and was always caught in a “mutually defining tension” be-
tween competing forces. This is to say, material (and not social) conditions drive 
historical change. The concept is often disconcerting since people do not fondly 
think of themselves as a product of material and economic forces. We prefer to 
regard ourselves as a unique and singular person capable of self-direction and 
autonomous choice. Nevertheless, we take this concept of being materially de-
termined for granted in the social sciences and frequently look to the material 
conditions that sit beneath various social problems or structures. For examples, 
what is Criminology if we do not think of people as a collection of relationships 
among various social forces? Can we consider large social groups as a collection 
of individuals, or must we always see them as a general trend with predictable 
actions based on collective responses to material circumstances? 
The root concept is that we do not, in the social sciences, tend to adopt 
the psychological view of people as exercising personal choice, and we also limit 
the Enlightenment vision (such as we find in the founding documents of the 
USA) of humans acting as rational creatures capable of self-directing choice. 
We instead look to “people” as an accumulation of the conflicts between differ-
ent forces, the most important of which surround economic activity. Hence, a 
sociologist or criminologist might look to unemployment or poverty in relation 
to problems such as addiction or criminal behavior. 
This may seem intuitively peculiar since Marx was a traditional human-
ist in the Classical tradition, working in several languages, actively translating 
Ancient Greek, and turning his attention to literature and art at every available 
opportunity. Yet, this is not as contradictory as it may at first seem. Based on 
relations among forces, when we talk about “Historical Materialism,” we 
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consider History or change as the product of conflicts among various forces. In 
order, they would be: 
 
• Economic organization 
• Material conditions 
• Existing social structures 
 
For instance, what happens when a form of economic organization 
(such as payment per item produced in a cottage industry) comes into conflict 
with a new technology, such as the modern factory? What happens in such a 
conflict when material conditions, such as transportation (trains, walking, or 
carriages), do not allow for the easy return home from work or commuting from 
the cottage where one’s family lives? Put another way, if people principally lived 
in rural settings and had an established way of life based on farming and cottage 
industries such as textiles, what happens when textile factories open in urban 
centers and drive down the per item cost of production? To view this change in 
terms of personal choice, the exercise of reason is fallacious—people do not have 
an option to rationally choose whether or not to continue in a cottage industry. 
I cannot “choose” to run a local Blockbuster VHS video rental store for the 
simple material reason that the technology is defunct. Economic necessity im-
pels change. 
This is precisely the situation Marx and Engels first considered through 
historical materials. Think of the creation of textile factories that made it im-
possible for the traditional cottage industries to sell knitting, weaving, or sewing 
as they had for hundreds of years. What did those workers do? If they chose not 
to accept migration to city centers and wage labor in textile factories, they would 
starve and other workers would simply take their place. Furthermore, how did 
this new condition (urbanization and wage labor) conflict with the existing so-
cial structures, such as monogamous relationships in the religiously sanctioned 
institution of marriage, but with the wife in the city working for wages and the 
husband still on the farm? This dialectical series of conflicts replaces providence 
and eschatology for Marxist history, but it is not humanist, it is materialist. 
 
The Social Formation 
 
The fully formulated concept of the Social Formation (Base and Superstruc-
ture) followed after the Communist Manifesto, but it is largely implicit in the 
materials we are reading. The classical understanding is that the full Social For-
mation (the totality of a given society, whether it is a nation, a city, or a town) 
is formed from two conflicted components: the Base (Infrastructure) and the 
Superstructure. The overall mode of production (the social formation) is deter-
mined by the dialectical tension between the Base and the legal/political Super-
structure that it gives rise to. They are also known as the “material productive 
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forces” and the “social relations of production.” Marx first developed the con-
cept explicitly in response to Alexis de Tocqueville. The Base refers to the or-
ganization of social life in relation to labor, such as how the working day is 
divided, how a division of labor is established, what material conditions prevail, 
property relations or forms of ownership, and so forth. The Superstructure, in 
contrast, includes the larger forms of social organization such as the political 
system, the judicial system, culture, religion, the state itself, and other social 
institutions. 
 Orthodox Marxism saw Base as determining Superstructure. This de-
terministic relationship underpins several elements of Leninist and Maoist 
forms of Marxism (to be discussed more next week), but the Western forms of 
Marxism seen in the Frankfurt School, the Birmingham School, Antonio 
Gramsci, and other Humanist forms of Marxism have consistently identified a 
mutual influence among the two. Godelier argued against the French Marxists 
that Base and Superstructure are “reciprocally-causal” and Friedman brought 
this to England in , though Raymond Williams (Birmingham School) had 
already argued the same notion from reading Marx’s manuscripts the year be-
fore (Williams –). 
 We do not need to follow this argument in detail. The crux for us is that 
there is a living dispute in Marxist philosophy over whether the dialectical un-
folding of history through conflicts among material forces will “determine” or 




Marx refers to dialectical conflicts and dialectical history, but the common term 
Dialectical Materialism is not in any of Marx’s works. The use of Dialectical 
Materialism is best known through Lenin’s use of term to emphasize material 
life over social consciousness, but for Marx the dialectical method was more 
simply an acknowledgement of conflict, such as in a dialogue. The standard 
articulation of Marx’s dialectics is 
 
thesis + antithesis = synthesis 
 
Simply put, the given state of affairs (thesis) comes into conflict with a new 
idea, new situation, or new technology that is not easily adapted to the estab-
lished norm (this is the antithesis). Through this conflict, a new synthesis 
emerges. A simple and contemporary example of such a conflict might be the 
availability of music through internet access –  this new technology conflicts 
with the existing record store and album format of the music industry. A painful 
struggle is now underway as the thesis + antithesis conflict until a new synthesis 
is formed. A genuinely Marxist understanding of this conflict, however, would 
note that distribution and sales outlets are not the sole “thesis” involved –  the 
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very concept of an “album” or the collecting together of different songs into one 
cohesive (and saleable) whole is also implicated. The artistic concept of what 
constitutes an “album” is just as much at stake as are systems of distribution and 
sale, and hence cultural and artistic norms follow economic forces. 
A more traditional example of the dialectical process would be to con-
sider how laws or social institutions (such as those surrounding marriage) 
change based on altered conditions. As mobility and relocation for employment 
have become more common in tandem with the increasing prevalence of dual 
income families, the legal regulations of marriage are adapting, such as “no-
fault” divorces in some American states or Canada as a whole (this is, of course, 
an extreme simplification of the complex social conflicts at play). In an aristo-
cratic Social Formation based on the inheritance of property and with social 
hierarchies based on birthright, matters of paternity and marriage are crucial –  
in a bourgeois or liberal Social Formation, they are less important. The more 
mobility we need as workers, the more our culturally inherited sense of “family 
values” must adapt to our new conditions, and hence culture follows economics. 
 
The Ruling Hobbits 
 
Many Marxist critics have had sharp words for fantasy fiction in general and 
Tolkien in particular. The quasi-Medievalisms of fantasy seem to nostalgically 
call for a reactionary (regressive) turn back to long past modes of social organi-
zation, undoing the progress from an aristocracy to a bourgeois democracy. 
Now that we have a better sense of Marx’s critique and philosophy of history, 
it is possible to look back across what we have read with questions about social 
class, hierarchy, economic modes of organization, and the social world of Mid-
dle-earth. As an example, Katherine Hume has given a pointed critique of Tol-
kien in her discussion of fantasy as a genre. For Hume, to discuss fantasy as a 
genre is to take up the matter of realism and the fantastic, as would be expected 
from her title Fantasy and Mimesis. She draws on Erich Auerbach’s work while, 
perhaps surprisingly, asking “Does escapist, fantasy refresh readers and send 
them back to their real world renewed? Or does it make their real world less 
tolerable? Or does it undercut the readers’ abilities to act –  as Marxists feel?” 
(Hume ). Her response presents fantasy as non-mimetic (not realistic or en-
gaged with realism) by nature, yet she sees it as still capable of commenting on 
the world and, contrary to the Marxist reading, able to act upon it. That is, for 
Hume, fantasy is not necessarily regressive, and it can foster positive social 
growth. Her worry, however, is about the social impact of literature, and less on 
its internal legendarium, aesthetic value, or entertainment. In other words, she 
ask does a given book compel readers to change their world for the better, or 
does it offer consolations for the difficulties of the world that comfort the reader 
into acceptance and inaction? In her interpretation, Tolkien does not. 
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With regard to social class and class conflict as the engine driving his-
tory, Hume describes Tolkien’s just king Aragorn scathingly:  
 
Few readers of Tolkien would accept his aristocratic values…. 
Aragorn is best because he is descended from a long line of kings 
and elves; those of lesser descent have fewer noble qualities, and 
there is no place in the power structure for a bright and ambi-
tious nobody. Yet… Tolkien addicts would still accept a one-
way ticket to Middle Earth [sic]” (Hume –).  
 
These are blunt critiques… It is unlikely we would today accept that a person 
is the best in our society and hence entitled to power because of their parents, 
yet this is exactly what Tolkien argues for Aragorn. This is, for Hume, an es-
sentially reactionary worldview espoused by the books. So, when The Lord of the 
Rings gives us comfort for our struggles, the novels do so by diminishing out 
ability to struggle for a better world as well, a world without aristocratic inher-
ited birthrights. For Hume, this “addiction” follows because  
 
Tolkien offers readers experience in the feeling of devoting one’s 
life to an unambiguously good cause, and the readers most 
gripped by this experience almost resemble early Christians in 
their craving for a beautiful ordering of experience, even if it is 
non-rational. Read in this passionate way, such heroic literature 
ceases to be casual escapism, and becomes something more 
deeply subversive. (Hume –).  
 
From this point, she goes on to compare such devotion to depravity. Hume’s 
views, at least in this, accord with the arguments of Marxist critics such as Rose-
mary Jackson, Fredric Jameson, and Darko Suvin, even if they are distressing to 
many Tolkien readers. However, they are also in the tradition of the novelist 
and critic Michael Moorcock’s “Epic Pooh.” In his polemical essay, Moorcock 
sees The Lord of the Rings as “a pernicious confirmation of the values of a morally 
bankrupt middle-class” (Moorcock ). Moorcock, of course, had a far more 
subversive and working-class background. The novelist and scholar China 
Miéville addresses the indignation that such assessments of Tolkien may pro-
voke by deflating a bit of its rhetorical flourish in his Introduction to Moor-
cock’s Wizardry and Wild Romance: A Study of Epic Fantasy, even while main-
taining the same position: “No matter how heartfelt your objections to The Lord 
of the Rings might be, the mere fact of stating them enters you into a kind of 
performative mode, and you’re a tired, too-old enfant terrible cranking out the 
iconoclasm as a party turn” (“Introduction” ). In other words, there has been 
a lot of critique of Tolkien in this vein, and much of it is quite true –  we would 
not accept these cultural logics in our modern world. Yet, they still appeal to us. 
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 What do we as readers make of this? Frodo and Bilbo’s upper-class sta-
tus in the Shire seems clear. There are hobbit families with property and wealth, 
and there are hobbit families that labor. Their positions are hereditary, and we 
can judge a hobbit’s merits based on paternity. Some own property and land 
while others engage in tenancy farming. The social model is close enough to 
the Medieval world, but it is deeply entrenched in class. Hume, again, gives the 
most direct rebuke to Tolkien by saying The Lord of the Rings 
 
reflects a child’s understanding of the world: food is delivered, 
put into the pantry, and eaten, but not paid for. The labor going 
into its production and the problems of isolated agricultural 
communities are ignored. The wealthy families have money but 
no source for it in tenant peasantry or stock-exchange invest-
ments. Another artistic flaw is the ineffectuality of the evil; the 
quasi-industrial damage done to the Shire is quickly rectified; 
the fellowship of the ring is too little damaged – Gandalf is even 
brought back to life. Heroism that exacts no price loses its mean-
ing…. [W]e are forced to concentrate on his exaltation of heroic 
action. He offers us a paradox as answer to the question of the 
value of the individual: the individual’s private and personal life 
is insignificant, but he can achieve significance through commit-
ment and dedication to a cause. (Hume ) 
 
Kindred challenges could easily be raised for C.S. Lewis’s works and the other 
Inklings as well as their normative influence across the genre running through 
the growth in heroic fantasy from  onward to today. Would we accept these 
values if they applied to working-class families in New Jersey who follow a new 
leader simply because he comes from a wealthy family in Manhattan, or would 
we critique the supposed “natural” system of domination? 
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
Please respond to any of these questions on the discussion board in WebCam-
pus. Remember, you have  point for your own comment and  point for re-
sponding to a classmate’s comment. This week, you will have two classmates 
initiating discussion by posting a “Critical Summary” that excerpts a few sen-
tences from Tolkien and a few sentences from Marx. 
 
. Does Tolkien’s Middle-earth embody a Social Formation we would find 
unacceptable today? If so, what is the nature of its deep appeal (and is 
this appeal akin to the ring’s seduction of its owners)? 
. Does Tolkien’s history unfold dialectically? 
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. Is the inevitable fading of elves and wizards from the world, leaving it 
for man, akin to the dialectical progress Marx envisions? 
. Everyone in this part of The Two Towers seems to need a master. Gol-
lum serves Frodo, and Aragorn rules. How might Marx interpret this? 
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. Distinguish between determinism in providence versus determinism in 
materialism. 
. Recognize the consciousness as distinct from choice. 
. Describe how the material world shapes consciousness. 
. Identify choices in The Two Towers that are influenced by outside forces 
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To recall our discussions last week, we began to consider Marx’s notion of his-
torical materialism and the conflict-based “dialectical” understanding of histor-
ical process. We also began to consider the problems that arise from the “sub-
ject” or self-conscious individual within these historical processes. The latter 
issue will occupy out attention this week while we rethink the Communist Man-
ifesto in the light of later works Marx had not published in his lifetime that deal 
with subjectivity. For Tolkien, we may also ask how novels written at the height 
of the modernist literary movement, a movement characterized by its “inward 
turn” to reveal states of consciousness for characters through a widespread 
“stream of consciousness” literary technique could be so devoid of thoughts. We 
rarely have access to the interiority of Tolkien’s characters. They do things and 
occasionally have feelings, but interior monologues of thought are almost non-
existent in a way that seems quite unique to Tolkien in comparison to many 
other fantasy writers. 
 
Determinism & Subjectivity 
 
As a quick reminder of our previous topics, you might rethink the popular 
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political comment in today’s environment, “It’s the economy, stupid.” The dif-
ficulty is that populists or television pundits making this comment most likely 
do not consider its deterministic or “Vulgar Marxist” connotations (that is, Eco-
nomic Determinism). If the economy determines political opinions, even in a 
liberal democracy, then the rational and self-reflexive choices made by individ-
uals cannot be reliably ascribed to the exercise of reason: they are deterministic 
components of the material conditions. The long philosophical traditions of the 
Enlightenment emphasizes rational humans capable of exercising reason in or-
der to make self-determining choices. From René Descartes to Immanuel Kant, 
this is the norm. Marx and Engels began to challenge this vision by focusing on 
the importance of material conditions and conflict (the dialectic between “the-
sis” and “antithesis”) in driving forward social change. Hence, by claiming “It’s 
the economy, stupid!” our ostensibly rationalist and bourgeois pundits are in 
fact espousing a fundamentally anti-Enlightenment opinion. Obviously, we 
cannot hold television personalities or entertainers to the same standard we hold 
the authors in this course, but the problem may help us to keep our philosoph-
ical discussions here distinct from the more prevalent information we receive 
through popular entertainment. 
 Less extreme opinions that echo the dialectical approach espoused by 
Engels and Marx abound. For instance, “soft” determinism is present whenever 
a politician, social worker, or activist suggests that by fixing or changing the 
economic woes of a society, we will reduce crime and imprisonment rates, vot-
ing trends, or general cultural happiness. This “soft” determinism allows for an 
uncertain process to exist between self-determining individuals in contrast to 
the collective behavior of humans in social groups or social systems as a whole. 
However, that’s not the whole story... 
Do we really want to think of “consciousness arising from material con-
ditions”? Do we have agency, or are we passive objects drawn coercively through 
a circumstance we only understand through the ideology in which we live? We 
rarely believe that we are simply a product of our conditions, but in extremis 
(extreme conditions) we do not particularly challenge the idea. Marx’s simple 
formulation in the Communist Manifesto is a question: 
 
Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man’s ideas, 
views and conceptions, in one word, man’s consciousness, 
changes with every change in the conditions of his material ex-
istence, in his social relations and in his social life? (Marx & En-
gels, Communist ) 
 
A more specific phrasing might be that the “conditions of material existence” 
(the “Base”) condition people’s social consciousness. We would surely think dif-
ferently if a radical change were to occur in our material conditions, such as 
moving from an able body to a disabled body, or from a position of affluence to 
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a position of poverty. We might, for instance, ask to what degree our conscious-
ness would change if we moved from one social class to another, one nation to 
another, or as many students in this course have experienced, from one language 
to another? While we still cling tenaciously to our sense of being rational crea-
tures capable of exercising reason in the process of making self-determining 
choices, we are at the same time shaped by these various conditions in which 
we find ourselves. Do we marry and fall in love in order to satisfy existing ma-
terial, social conflicts? Do we move to new locations or nations based on eco-
nomic necessity or pressure? 
More specifically, are these influences deterministic? This entails asking 
if these influences are something that cannot be socially resisted, such as work-
ers moving to urban centers for factory work during the Industrial Revolution 
– it is deterministic because any worker who did not move would be replaced 
by one who would, and hence the social transformation is deterministic even 
while individual choice remains possible through meaningless to history. Alter-
natively, we might ask if these processes are of a type in which we exercise ra-
tional choice even while that choice is unfairly negotiated (in Antonio Gram-
sci’s terminology). We choose but never freely. 
Hegelian Dialectics posit an Enlightenment move from “fragments to 
reality” (in Hegel’s sense) via the dialectical interactions of irrational to rational 
forces. For Hegel, this is humanity’s movement from the irrational to the ra-
tional through experience (experience drives us from irrationality to reason). 
This same teleology is the Marxist vision of History in which the move from 
the rule of Kings to the rule of an Aristocracy to the rise of the wealthy middle-
class bourgeoisie is then followed by a new social system oriented toward the 
best interests of the working population. 
As Marx writes in the Communist Manifesto, when he directly addresses 
the bourgeoisie: 
 
Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your 
bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your juris-
prudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a 
will, whose essential character and direction are determined by 
the economical conditions of existence of your class. 
The selfish misconception that induces you to transform 
into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social forms spring-
ing from your present mode of production and form of property 
– historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of 
production – this misconception you share with every ruling 
class that has preceded you. (Marx & Engels, Communist ) 
 
An unstated component of Marx’s indictment of the bourgeois (capitalist 
wealthy middle class) in this passage is the relationship between self-identity or 
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the concept of an Enlightened and rational subject and the “ideas” that are “but 
the outgrowth of... bourgeois production and bourgeois property” (). Insofar 
as Marx sees jurisprudence (the law courts) as “determined by the economical 
conditions,” we might ask if the rational and self-determining subject of those 
laws (the reason we have mens rea in our legal system, meaning guilt by intention 
rather than the act alone) also “spring[s] from [the] present mode of production 
and form of property” (). At the same time, however, Marx keeps what he 
calls the “selfish misconception” of the wealthy from the seemingly positive and 
desirable “eternal laws of nature and of reason” (). 
 
György Lukács & Subjectivity 
 
Lukács (–) was a Hungarian philosopher, professor, and politician 
who led the Westernization of Marxism and departed from Soviet orthodoxy. 
He was equally active in the arts and wrote extensively on literary subjects as 
well as critical theory. His ties to and condemnation of Stalinism are much de-
bated, though his notion of the “subject” (the active individual capable of self-
determining choice) is at the heart of much of the dispute between the loosely 
defined Western versus Soviet or Maoist versions of Marxism. In brief, the con-
cept of a rational “subject” or self who makes choices and takes action in the 
world is, for Lukács, a misnomer – the social context is, for Lukács, the basis 
for subjectivity, and not the reverse (individuals being the basis for social organ-
ization). This is a simplification, but it gives an entrance to the dispute and the 
actions people have taken based on this matter. For instance, if subjectivity is 
determined by social existence, then changes to the material social world will 
change subjectivity. Hence, rather than convincing rational subjects that they 
should change how they live, by changing how they live, one would effectively 
convince them. Late in life, Lukács repudiated this view, but it is an effective 
summation of several elements of Stalin’s and Mao’s different revisions to Marx. 
In his History and Class Consciousness, Lukács returns to the problem of 
class consciousness and dialectical materialism, and in particular to a highly 
charged and specific discussion of consciousness by Marx. Marx writes in his 
“Preface” to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy that “It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence 
that determines their consciousness” (Marx, “Preface” ). The complete pas-
sage from Marx, on which Lukács focuses, reads as follows in context: 
 
The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once 
reached, became the guiding principle of my studies can be sum-
marised as follows.  
In the social production of their existence, men inevita-
bly enter into definite relations, which are independent of their 
will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage 
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in the development of their material forces of production. The 
totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal 
and political superstructure and to which correspond definite 
forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of mate-
rial life conditions the general process of social, political and in-
tellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines 
their existence, but their social existence that determines their 
consciousness. (Marx, “Preface” –) 
 
There are several key terms in this passage that should be familiar from the 
previous week’s readings in The Communist Manifesto. For instance, the “stages” 
of development reflect Marx’s sense of how economic life transforms society, 
such as the movement form an aristocratic form of economic and social organ-
ization to a capitalist form based on the bourgeoisie. The relations among peo-
ple change based on these different social forms of organization, such as dimin-
ishing aristocratic privilege and status based on family and birth rather than 
economic success or innovation. Likewise, “superstructure” refers to the social 
and cultural forms of organization, such as social institutions (the law, courts, 
judiciary, educational institutions, and so forth). A simplified restatement of 
Marx’s ideas might then be “in social circumstances, people enter relationships 
that are independent of their individual will, and these relationships form the 
superstructure of society – as a consequence, individual will or consciousness 
does not create social life, but rather social life creates the context and bounda-
ries within which that individual consciousness can exist.” 
 
Understanding The Communist Manifesto Through Close Reading 
 
With these concepts now in place, or at least the basis for the disputes estab-
lished, try returning to The Communist Manifesto for more attentive readings. 
The section “Proletarians and Communists” (-) from last week may be 
particularly productive for this line of analysis. For instance, how do you now 
read the passage that opened this week’s section of the Study Guide? 
 
Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your 
bourgeois production and bourgeois property..., a will, whose es-
sential character and direction are determined by the economical 
conditions of existence of your class. 
The selfish misconception that induces you to transform 
into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social forms spring-
ing from your present mode of production and form of property 
– historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of 
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production – this misconception you share with every ruling 
class that has preceded you. (Marx & Engels, Communist ) 
 
How you read this passage will likely shape how you understand the more com-
plex works Marx developed later in his life. Is this an indictment against those 
whose economic interests make them blind to the rights and dignity of others, 
dignity based on the capacity for reason and self-determining choice? Or, is this 
a rejection of any notion of subjectivity or selfhood apart from an uncontrolled 
and uncontrollable reflection of material conditions? More simply, is Marxism 
humanist or determinist? Does it reject the rule of kings, aristocrats, and capi-
talists in order to liberate self-conscious people, or is it an analysis of an inevi-
table process for which self-consciousness and choice are irrelevant? 
The answer is likely both, since many people will happily say “It’s the 
economy, stupid” (meaning people vote [make self-determining choices] based 
on the economic situation of the nation) while at the same time believing in 
voting as a meaningful process. The conflict is between () economic determin-
ism and () the Enlightenment concept of self-determining choice through the 
exercise of reason. Alas, in everyday life, we float freely between both ideas 
without carefully recognizing that they are mutually exclusive and disprove each 
other. 
Alternatively, you might ask what are the virtues of Marxism if you ap-
proach it through a Humanist perspective, and also what are its limitations? 
Likewise, if you approach Marxism through an anti-humanist viewpoint, what 
are its productive uses and limitations? 
 
Consciousness: Determined & Contextualized 
 
As we consider Marx’s concept of consciousness determined by social existence, 
we might do well to contrast this against Gollum’s and Sméagol’s consciousness 
as determined by the Ring. Do we hold Gollum responsible for his decisions? 
Should we hold Frodo responsible for his final decision at the end of the novels 
while standing over the fires of the Crack of Doom? Does this relate to whether 
we should hold ourselves responsible for decisions that are deeply determined 
or contextualized by our social existence (meaning our economic circumstances 
and the structure of our material world)? 
 Raymond Williams, as we saw in Week , argued that a better transla-
tion of Marx’s wording in the “Preface” to A Contribution to the Critique of Po-
litical Economy is that “contextualizes” is more accurate than “determines” (Wil-
liams. This is not actually true. “Determines” is the right word, and Williams 
surely knew this. His argument, then, is more by way of a revision or correction 
that he, Williams, wished to make. Would we alter our views if we instead ar-
gued that our consciousness is “contextualized” by our conditions or even “un-
fairly negotiated” based on our conditions? The latter phrasing comes from the 
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Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and his argument that workers make decisions 
that are unfairly negotiated with those who hold power and the beliefs with 
which they were raised (recall in Week  how we saw Fredric Jameson arguing 
that Tolkien’s and fantasy fiction’s magic set up a contrast between “good and 
evil” in which “good” supports the existing social world and “evil” seeks to 
change it). Do we hold people uniquely responsible for making decisions based 
on ethical and moral beliefs with which they are raised and that their society 
regards as normal? Is King Théoden to be held responsible while under Gríma 
Wormtongue’s sway? How we think of ethics, or if we think of ethics at all, 
relates closely to how we answer these questions about subjectivity. 
 As a larger problem, we might also consider the contrast between the 
narrative mode of the novel and the films. Where the novel offers us a parallel 
series of plots (which is now almost ubiquitous in the fantasy genre), the films 
give us a chronological narrative. Does this alter our understanding of the book 
and our approach to the films? If it shapes our structural understanding of ei-
ther, does this mean we have a free hand for our interpretation, or has it been 
“contextualized” or even “determined” by its format? Comparing your experi-
ence of the film and the novel may be useful for this, in particular by asking how 
you as an individual exercised choice in your understanding of the work and how 
the different format shaped it? 
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
Please respond to any of these questions on the discussion board in WebCam-
pus. Remember, you have  point for your own comment and  point for re-
sponding to a classmate’s comment. This week, you will have two classmates 
initiating discussion by posting a “Critical Summary” that excerpts a few sen-
tences from Tolkien and a few sentences from Marx. 
 
. Is Marx’s determinism eschatological? 
. How do Marx’s ideas of “consciousness” relate to our earlier discussions 
of free will? 
. If we accept Marx’s arguments about consciousness, is it possible to still 
discuss ethics and ethical choices? 
. How might you compare the problem of evil in Providence with Marx’s 
dialectical history and social existence determining consciousness? 
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. Distinguish Nietzsche’s concern with “truth” from the theological and 
anti-theological elements of “The Madman.” 
. Recognize choice and the self as distinct from the choices being made. 
. Describe choices made in The Return of the King. 
. Identify Faramir’s choices in The Return of the King as distinct from what 
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This week we begin The Return of the King and start to ask how philosophy 
changes after our contrast between theology and materialism. If we notice a 
similarity between theology and materialism in their juxtaposition, such as es-
chatological paradigms, the idea of providence, and a direction to history that 
is teleological, this seems natural. After all, how could we expect a new philos-
ophy that did not answer the same questions as the old philosophy? Nietzsche 
will challenge us to set aside those questions and to ask new ones. His philo-
sophical work is often described as more literary, drifting as it does into poetry, 
narrative, aphorisms, and word play rather than the familiar pathways of logic 
and argument. Nietzsche will sometimes set intuition ahead of reason and im-
pulse ahead of rationality. However, a purpose for this different method of do-
ing philosophy comes from Nietzsche’s focus on what he called “errors,” such 





The first thing for us to notice about Nietzsche’s “The Madman” is that he is 
mad. This may seem obvious, but while the phrase “God is dead” is often re-
peated or parodied, when taken in its context, we are led to far more difficult 
questions. Nietzsche does not broach the phrase “God is dead” lightly and puts 
the words in the mouth of a madman. It is also the second time Nietzsche uses 
the phrase in the book from which we take this excerpt. This thought experi-
ment comes to us from The Gay Science (our edition draws on the public domain 
first English edition, The Joyful Wisdom), which takes its title from the idea of a 
poetic renewal in southern France (Provence) following the decline of the trou-
badour tradition. The lone voice of the troubadour or poet is a repeated philo-
sophical trope here with an emphasis on rigorous thought leading to joy rather 
than sorrow. 
 The first thing we may notice in this short piece is that Nietzsche does 
not actually advance any argument here against theology or the existence of the 
divine. It is right to assume that he is not defending them, but this particular 
scene does not actually argue for the death of God. Instead, we see Nietzsche 
contemplating what such an assertion would mean (not its truth or falsity). This 
may seem a subtle distinction, but it tells us much about how to approach his 
work. The madman, for instance, does not find “joy” in this assertion, and we 
are left with the closing question “What are these churches now?” (Nietzsche 
). Rather than questioning religious faith, the problem is what the giant edi-
fice of faith would be (its churches, buildings, infrastructure, etc.). Since Nie-
tzsche’s concern in the book is philosophy, we can see this as a form of allegory: 
if philosophy decouples itself from theology, what then is philosophy? If phi-
losophy chooses to simply not ask questions about the divine or the metaphys-
ical anymore, what then does philosophy do? Even more problematically, since 
the madman does not seem to be a person we should emulate, nor are those 
who mock him, how might this problem guide us to joy? 
 The typical approach to Nietzsche’s madman thus takes two directions. 
There is the less rigorous and likely more familiar acceptance or rejection of the 
death of God. This can range from the arguments of atheists and theists alike, 
such as the graffiti scrawl “God is dead! – Nietzsche” that we may compare to 
the “new atheism” movement of Christopher Hitchens’s God is Not Great () 
and Richard Dawkins’s The God Delusion (). The rebuttal to this is again 
the graffiti scrawl that crosses our the Nietzschean epigram to replace it with 
“Nietzsche is dead! – God,” and some have called this response to the new athe-
ism movement the “new apologetics” (or perhaps more accurately, a new “new 
apologetics” following on the first new apologetics at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century). For our purposes, we will take a second and more rigorous ap-
proach: the assertions that both are errors created by demanding an absolute 
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truth, and as such, both draw on philosophical systems oriented to the absolute 
and the divine. Nietzsche’s question is more difficult. What is philosophy if it 




Nietzsche’s quarrel with truth as a concept is long. This does not mean he was 
not committed to rigorous intellectual interrogation of concepts and ideas, but 
rather that he sought to distinguish between what one may know or not know 
from what one chooses to do or to believe. The argument about God would be, 
for Nietzsche, an instance of seeking “truth” but doing so in error. The question 
for Nietzsche is not whether or not to believe (William James may provoke our 
thoughts about just a willful choice) but rather recognizing that this is a choice 
and not a philosophical truth. If philosophy is concerned with what may be 
known, then the existence of the divine (apart from the hubris of arguing a hu-
man may know the divine) is not a matter of truth. It is unknowable in either 
direction. So, to present it as an assertion of truth is to make an error. People 
believe or do not believe, but that is a question of belief and not a question of 
truth. For Nietzsche, claiming that one believes or does not believe because that 
belief is “true” is mentally lazy – it is a way of avoiding responsibility for what 
one has chosen to believe. A better and more joyful proposition would be to claim 
responsibility oneself for one’s beliefs. 
This is the crux of a line of thought we will see in Existentialism: re-
sponsibility. One of Nietzsche’s aims was to disengage such decisions from the 
illusion of “truth”: 
 
When the madman claims that this tremendous event is still on 
its way, etc, he is claiming that even the atheists do not appreci-
ate the meaning of “the death of God.” For God here is not 
merely the metaphysical underpinning of the Christian cosmol-
ogy. He is the very notion of a basis, an external authority, on 
which opinions are founded – the very notion of a horizon 
against which everything can be seen and judged. (Gemes ) 
 
Gemes’s argument here is far-reaching. Like Nietzsche, he does not take a po-
sition on the theological or anti-theological assertion of truth but instead ques-
tions the notion of truth itself. For Gemes, this comes by recognizing how both 
the theistic and atheistic claims are rooted in an assertion of “truth” rather than 
a personal decision, hence making the act of choosing inferior to the fact of 
“truth” – in effect, I am not responsible for my choices, truth is: 
 
According to Nietzsche, a primary function of the invocation of 
God is the provision of a means of escaping responsibility. For 
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the Christian the world, including himself, is a product of the 
will of God. Truth, reality, is founded in God for the world is 
God’s word. Typically atheists, having rejected God as the basis 
of all values and belief, supply a new basis. (Gemes ) 
 
Gemes goes on the look at those various bases as forms of “truth,” ranging from 
utilitarianism’s “greatest good” to positivism’s empirical observation. All of 
these, Gemes argues in his approach to Nietzsche, weaken the self by subjugat-
ing it to a concept of “truth” (real or not). And this kind of dismissal of one’s 
self cannot lead to the “joy” that is Nietzsche’s goal: 
 
In each case what is being denied is the effect of the individual 
will. In effect the interlocutor is saying, I do not believe this be-
cause I choose to, because this kind of belief suits …, I believe 
this because that is how things are and hence I cannot choose 
otherwise and neither can you. (Gemes ) 
 
The possibility for joy then comes from placing that individual at the center of 
this process again. Joy comes from deciding “I choose this or that” without hid-
ing behind the “error” of truth and by taking responsibility for this choice. Nie-
tzsche’s argument, then, is not that truth does or does not exist, but rather that 
he does not have anything to say about truth. Instead, he has things to say about 
the self and its choices. What if philosophy’s role is to help us consider ways of 
living and choosing rather than ways of moving ever-closer to truth? How do 




We may consider a different madman to explore Nietzsche’s movement beyond 
truth. Where Blount encourages us to see the making of meaning and purpose 
through hobbits, we might also look to Faramir’s decision to honor the com-
mands of his madman father, Denethor. Faramir is (insanely) commanded to 
defend Osgiliath against Sauron’s orcs, which is not possible. We as readers see 
this as a question of truth in the narrative: who is the true King and what is the 
truth of the threat to Minas Tirith? Denethor has looked into the palantír and 
despaired of any possible victory, but we as readers see this as untrue. Likewise, 
Denethor will not accept Aragorn as the true King, which we also see as untrue. 
Faramir’s question is different, though. His is not a question of what is true but 
what he must do. Must he disobey his father, or must he risk his life? Where 
Denethor is led to despair by grasping after truth (which is possible and what is 
not), but Faramir has hope based on deciding what he must do. Their outcomes 
may tell us much about the possibility for joy in an existential worldview. After 
all, we do not decide what world we inhabit nor what challenges we will face, 
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and as Tolkien is so often quoted as saying, “All we have to decide is what to 
do with the time that is given us” (Tolkien, Fellowship ).  
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
Please respond to any of these questions on the discussion board in WebCam-
pus. Remember, you have  point for your own comment and  point for re-
sponding to a classmate’s comment. This week, you will have two classmates 
initiating discussion by posting a “Critical Summary” that excerpts a few sen-
tences from Tolkien and a few sentences from Westphal. 
 
. Why is Nietzsche’s phrase “God is dead” spoken by a madman? 
. What is the importance of truth in Nietzsche’s philosophy? 
. What is an example of an “error” in Nietzsche’s approach to philosophy? 
. How do choice and truth relate to each other in The Return of the King? 
. Can we reconcile Tolkien and Nietzsche on some topics? 
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. Distinguish between existentialism and providence as concepts. 
. Relate Nietzsche’s sense of “Truth” to existential “essence.” 
. Describe mortality and immortality in relation to “meaning” in The Re-
turn of the King. 
. Identify both purpose and meaning in The Return of the King and de-
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The questions behind much of philosophy, such as “What is death?” and “What 
is the meaning of life?” give us a focus for this week’s readings. This means we 
will confront mortality and meaning together, but we should also ask ourselves 
if these ideas must always be conjoined. For example, does mortality drive the 
search for meaning? Without mortality, would we feel as strong a drive for pur-
pose and meaning? And if we focus on the end of life, what about its beginning, 
and what comes before? Does the purpose of life precede our life, or does it 
proceed from living? Specifically, we will use Jean-Paul Sartre’s approach to ex-
istentialism to question Tolkien’s immortal elves and mortal humans. We are 
also straining at the edges of philosophy and art. Just as Nietzsche set aside 
many of the central arguments of philosophy and engaged in a style of writing 
sometimes closer to literature than philosophy, Sartre likewise moved freely be-
tween his literary and philosophical writings. 
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Existentialism & Humanism 
 
Existentialism is usually understood in a line of growth from the Danish phi-
losopher Søren Kierkegaard to Nietzsche, Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, and Albert Camus. Sartre formalized the use of the term “ex-
istentialism” as a school of thought, although he drew on a number of other 
philosophers in doing so, such as Martin Heidegger’s phenomenological work. 
The French philosophers who were directly connected to Sartre (de Beauvoir 
was his partner, and both Merleau-Ponty and Camus were his friends, while 
most of them had been students together) also moved freely across philosophy 
and literature. Camus and Sartre both were awarded the Nobel Prize in Liter-
ature, and all of them apart from Merleau-Ponty wrote literary works as exten-
sively as they did philosophy. In this sense, existentialism is as deeply entangled 
with ways of living, ways of being in a community, and ways of being a creative 
artist as it is a political and phenomenological philosophy. 
 Sartre’s “Existentialism is a Humanism” is one of his earliest existential-
ist works and the first in which he accepted the term “existentialism” for his 
work. While he later altered his views in this piece, both refining and changing 
several ideas, it remains a definitional work of existential philosophy. One of 
the opening gestures is to echo Kierkegaard’s approach to Christian faith: ab-
surdity. Where Kierkegaard had, as a Christian, felt that theological truths ex-
ceed rationality, and hence theological truths cannot be known through reason 
alone, Sartre extended the concept after Nietzsche without its connection to 
theology or faith. For this reason, the opening five paragraphs of “Existential-
ism is a Humanism” are more important than their brevity may suggest – they 
clarify how Sartre’s argument relates to other major schools of philosophy 
around him in that moment. The lecture on which the essay (and later book) is 
based was given in , shortly after the end of World War II, and he pub-
lished the major book on which the lecture is based, Being and Nothingness, in 
 while France was occupied by Nazi Germany – the importance of com-
munist groups to the underground resistance, and the perceived collaboration 
of the Catholic Church shaped the historical moment in which Sartre’s works 
emerged. All of the ideas from the lecture with which we engaged are explored 
in much greater detail in Being and Nothingness. Notably, Sartre sets existential-
ism in contrast with both Marxist materialism and Christian providence by say-
ing his paradigm rejects the determinism of both. Also, much like we have seen 
with Nietzsche and our explorations of ethics, Sartre privileges choice as a cen-
tral expression of being. If existentialism offers a humanism, it is a sense of 
humanity rooted in the act of choosing. 
 This leads Sartre to his first articulation of the dictum “existence pre-
cedes essence” (“Existentialism”), which he developed in more detail in subse-
quent works. This is to say, we exist before we have purpose and meaning. His 
example to explain this is the paperknife, for which the purpose of cutting open 
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paper (ie: envelopes or a French-bound book) precedes its production, so it is the 
opposite of a human experience. In other words, a person had a need for some-
thing with which to open paper before the knife specifically designed for this 
purpose was made, and hence the idea of a paperknife came before the actual 
modern product. The paperknife’s essence precedes its existence. We craft tools 
to suit a need, so the purpose precedes the tool’s existence – this is unlike hu-
mans. For context, “French binding” means that the folds of paper are in the 
external (not bound) portion of a book, and so to read a book, one would need 
to cut open this folded edge, just like cutting open an envelope today. It is in a 
sense like a magazine stapled on the wrong side, so that you would need to cut 
open each page. This is why with some older books, researchers can know what 
parts of a book its owner (ie: a specific author or philosopher like Tolkien or 
Sartre) had not read… Today, the aesthetic value of these cut pages in older 
books now lead us an artificially produced “rough” edge – this is meant to be a 
“luxury binding” for aesthetic appeal. Consider any books you have seen in 
bookshops that have a smooth edge (like your paperback copies of The Lord of 
the Rings) in contrast to those with a rough or “ripped” edge – this is a nostalgic 
aesthetic for those who are used to having French bindings cut open. It also 
means that for Sartre, the paperknife is a ubiquitous object for reading and ac-
ademic life. 
 For the paperknife to have been designed for the purpose of cutting 
open books and letters, this means that its purpose or meaning for existence (its 
“essence”) preceded its actual existence. It was made to fulfil a purpose. We may 
think the same way about our lives, and in the theological discussions that pre-
ceded Spring Break in this course, we do indeed see the purpose of life as living 
a moral and ethical existence, minimizing harm, maximizing good, and so forth. 
These values tend to be based on a religious belief in the divine or in providence 
(God’s plan) as an essence or purpose for us that precedes our own existence. 
That is, we use these approaches with the same sense as if we were a paperknife: 
“essence” (or purpose) precedes “existence.” Sartre’s existentialism reverses this 
as a fundamental belief. For Sartre, if there is no recourse to an omnipotent 
deity to provide the “essence” or purpose of life, then “there is at least one being 
whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be 
defined by any conception of it. That being is man” (“Existentialism”). We, as 
humans, exist before we have a purpose. Purpose, therefore, follows after exist-
ence. More radically, purpose is something made not given, and it is made by 
the individual’s choices and actions. 
 Also at the center of existentialism is the relationship between subject 
and object or Self and Other. Where Sartre contends that existentialism “does 
not make man into an object” (“Existentialism”), his point is the existential fo-
cus is on the acting subject. In a grammatical sense, the subject in a sentence 
does the verb to an object, such as “I hit the tree.” The subject “I” hits the object 
“tree.” Rather than seeing human beings as determined by the world, 
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existentialism posits the human as an acting subject. This is why Sartre’s im-
mediate contrast is to materialism – his aim is to reject materialist determinism 
even while retaining its revolutionary aim to transform the world. For the same 
reason, he refutes any concept of Providence or predestination. Notice as well 
the extent of Sartre’s reliance here on literary examples. To extend these claims, 
he turns to novels like George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss rather than to news 
reports of real people in contemporary situations. We may, in this use of exam-
ples, also recognize how deeply rooted existentialism is in creative activity and 
artistic creation. 
 
Absurdism & Mortality 
 
Sartre’s friend Albert Camus described his own understanding of existentialism 
as “absurdist.” This is an extension of the non-rational approach to theology 
described above from Kierkegaard. Camus’s argument extends beyond the idea 
that theological truths cannot be approached through reason alone. For Camus, 
the “essence” or purpose that proceeds after existence must confront the reality 
of mortality. If all meaning is made by the individual’s choices, then that “es-
sence” ends when the individual perishes. However, rather than seeing this as 
an extreme nihilist might (that all existence is without purpose, that all “essence” 
or meaning to life is false, and that all ethics are arbitrary), Camus’s sense of the 
absurd seeks a positive end. By confronting the absurdity of existence, the indi-
vidual can, by continuously choosing to live, thereby produce a joyous “essence” 
or meaning to life. That is, the meaning of life would be to live despite the 
absurdity of it. In a simplistic sense, this might mean being happy without being 
hopeful. In another sense, it means that life today may be filled with happiness 
and purpose whether there is more life tomorrow or not. 
 For our reading of Bill Davis’s chapter on Tolkien’s immortal elves and 
mortal men, this means that humans in their finitude find freedom only when 
they accept their limitedness and mortality while dedicating themselves to their 
“essence” or meaning. Elves, who are not mortal in Tolkien’s books, face a more 
difficult challenge than accepting death… 
 
“within the circles of the world” 
 
Davis points to the immortality of the Elves in contrast to the mortality of the 
Hobbits and humans by saying “their souls remain ‘within the circles of the 
world’” (Davis ). However, this phrase is not given a clear citation to Tol-
kien, and a careful reader will notice that it recurs. The first instance is dark but 
connects closely to the concerns of existentialism that we have outlined and to 




“I speak no comfort to you, for there is no comfort for such pain 
within the circles of the world. The uttermost choice is before 
you: to repent and go to the Havens and bear away into the West 
the memory of our days together that shall there be evergreen 
but never more than memory or else to abide the Doom of Men.” 
(Tolkien, Return ). 
 
This is the choice for Arwen. She may have elven immortality by leaving 
Aragorn, but then she would then not have the experience of life and love itself. 
Alternatively, she can live and experience love with the price of mortality. By 
contrast, the phrase recurs in the Appendix to The Return of the King. Here we 
learn of the Númenoreans that Aragorn while dying says to Arwen “In sorrow 
we must go, but not in despair. Behold! we are not bound for ever to the circles 
of the world, and beyond them is more than memory. Farewell!” (Tolkien, Re-
turn ). In context, this means that a dying human may have sorrow at death 
but not despair, for there is another life beyond the world itself. This view fits 
very readily into Tolkien’s Catholicism. The fascination for us may lie in the 
repetition of “circles of the world” meaning material existence and “memory.” 
The elves in their material immortality have memory but little access to an ex-
istential sense of purpose or “essence,” while the humans in their mortal condi-
tion gain both a meaning for life and something uncertain “beyond them” that 
is “more than memory.”  
 While Tolkien almost certainly understood this “beyond” in religious 
terms as heaven, to which humans may attain after death, Davis presents this 
as an existential difference between elves and humans. Human may fulfill their 
nature precisely because they are mortal, which is a way of being true to the 
“essence” they have created for themselves or a way of being “authentic” in Sar-
tre’s sense. As Davis points out, the most problematic contrast is the Ring 
Wraithes, who are continuing to exist but do so in contradiction of their es-
sence. They are immortal only by unnaturally contradicting their nature or es-
sence. Elves, in contrast, have no such possibility since their essence precedes 
their existence. They do not change, and their growth as individuals appears to 
be fixed at a static point. 
 Sartre and Camus also emphasize the issue of choice and freedom, as 
does Davis, in particular as he discusses Aragorn and Arwen: 
 
Arwen does not choose death for its own sake. She chooses life 
with Aragorn for its own sake and accepts eventual death as a 
price she is willing to pay to get it. (Davis ) 
 
Our challenge as readers is to decide how we resolve this puzzle. Aragorn be-
lieves in a life beyond the “circles of the world,” and we may through Tolkien’s 
Catholicism simply call this “Heaven.” However, as we realized earlier in Week 
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, Tolkien was perfectly aware from his scholarly work on the English language 
that the word “Heaven” is itself from the pagan Old English traditions, so our 
terminology becomes challenging. What exactly he means for Aragorn and Ar-
wen moving beyond the “circles of the world” is still very much open to inter-
pretation. Must we value Arwen’s choice to be mortal only based on Aragorn’s 
dying expression of belief in another form of immortality beyond the world? Do 
we instead read with Davis through Sartre that Arwen fulfills her “essence” or 
meaning in life by choosing her most authentic existence, regardless of what she 
believes about death? Is mortality a necessary condition for meaning, purpose, 
or “essence”? 
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
Please respond to any of these questions on the discussion board in WebCam-
pus. Remember, you have  point for your own comment and  point for re-
sponding to a classmate’s comment. This week, you will also have two class-
mates initiating discussion by posting a “Critical Summary” that excerpts a few 
sentences from Tolkien and a few sentences from Sartre and Davis. 
 
. What does Sartre mean by “essence” when he says “Existence precedes 
essence”? 
. In Week , Gemes situated Nietzsche’s “Joyful Wisdom” as the indi-
vidual’s act of choosing. How does this relate to Sartre on existentialism? 
. Can literary and philosophical truths or meanings co-exist together? 
. Why is death a “gift” for humans in Tolkien’s books? 
. Is it possible for Davis to reconcile human choices of authentic existence 
with Tolkien’s theology? 
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. Distinguish between subjects and objects. 
. Recognize “green time” in Tolkien. 
. Describe “symmetrical discourse” in Actor-network Theory. 




Light, Andrew. “Tolkien’s Green Time: Environmental Themes in The Lord 
of the Rings.” The Lord of the Rings & Philosophy, edited by Gregory 
Bassham and Eric Bronson, Open Court, , pp. –.  
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As we near the end of our quest, we begin to ask some challenging questions, 
“here at the end of all things” (Tolkien, Return ) about Tolkien and about 
our contemporary world. Andrew Light returns us to the beginning with ques-
tions about “green time” and deep ecology through Treebeard and the ents but, 
even more importantly, Tom Bombadil. We will extend this by introducing the 
concepts of Actor-network Theory (ANT) from Sociology, which gives us a 
new way of discussing (or translating) the interactions of the human and non-
human. Our title draws from Tolkien’s extensive work on the Middle English 
romance Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, a poem that has garnered increasing 




Andrew Light opens his chapter “Tolkien’s Green Time” by dodging the ques-
tion of why he is bringing philosophical concepts to popular culture by suggest-
ing this seems somehow surprising. In his phrasing, “I’m somewhat embar-
rassed because she’s a serious art historian and I worry that she’ll mistakenly 
think I’m dabbling in cultural studies” (Light ). By this point in our 
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readings, hopefully the question of whether or not popular culture and cultural 
studies can yield complex philosophical questions has been dispelled, although 
he is rather more specific in his dodge. Light specifies “cultural studies,” and in 
this he is actually quite serious, just not for the reason we might assume. Rather 
that implying that reading popular culture is somehow “low brow” for an aca-
demic, he is instead insisting that his approach to ecological issues and philos-
ophy is distinct from what cultural studies does: analyzing cultural products 
within the context of their production and consumption. We must wait until 
the next page before he makes this clear. When he asks himself “Couldn’t this 
be used as a launching pad for a discussion of sustainable development or glob-
alization today” (), the point is that while this is certainly possible, this 
would be the domain of cultural studies, and his interests are less in how we 
consume this set of texts today as a society (or as one society that consumes 
them today). Instead, his focus is on “the representation of a kind of geologic 
or naturally scaled time in The Lord of the Rings” (). By this, he means “a 
sense of the past through which ‘nature’ sets the context for events in the pre-
sent” (). He calls this “green time” in Tolkien, or a sense of time that is 
apprehensible to not only anthropomorphized creatures like ents but also to 
immortals bound up with the natural world like Tom Bombadil, or even to the 
world itself in the form of trees or mountains. It is this last comparison that 
will, below, lead us into a brief outline of Actor-network Theory. 
 The anthropomorphizing of trees into ents tempts us as readers toward 
an allegorical reading, and Light moves away from this very quickly. Where he 
considers the ents, it is in exactly the same frame of mind as his rejection of 
“cultural studies” as his aim or of using the text as a way to discuss “sustainable 
development or globalization today” (, ). These may be fine things to 
do, but his purpose is in lending a voice to the non-human, and hence rather 
than casting the ents as an allegory for our environmental degradations today, 
he instead offers a different position: 
 
But what he [Treebeard] and the other ents do is not simply take 
care of the forest as much as they serve as a narrative device that 
allows the forest to speak for itself…. In this sense no one stands 
for anything in Middle-earth, but the place itself is fully ani-
mated so that it stands for itself, and even speaks for itself at 
times. (). 
 
This speaking for itself is the crucial issue for Light. This issue of a forest or 
complex and non-human system speaking for itself is at the heart of his con-
tention. For Light, “no doubt if a forest or ecosystem could talk we wouldn’t 
understand it” () because we share no common perspective with it. It lives 
in a very, very long “green time” that is outside of our mental apparatus. This 
means that when we anthropomorphize non-human life or systems into a 
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human-like character, we (or the author) must either erase these enormous 
forms of difference or represent them in a way that makes the profound feeling 
of difference felt by the readers. Light suggests that Tolkien does the latter 




Actor-network Theory (ANT) is a useful way of understanding what drives 
Light’s argument. ANT itself grew out of sociological studies of science and the 
history of science (STS or Science and Technology Studies). As a theory of 
translation between the human and the non-human, ANT is typically under-
stood through a set of studies that may be best summarized through Michel 
Callon’s article “Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication 
of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay” in the breakthrough book 
edited by John Law, Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge. This 
is a simplified history, but it makes the point. Callon’s analysis was of the rela-
tionships among fishermen, scallops (clams), and the French government. 
While we would typically look at the fisherman and the government as express-
ing human agency and decision-making, and from this grant these groups a 
sense of human subjectivity, this issue in discourse (how we talk about things) 
overlooks the obvious importance of the activities of the scallops. That large 
groups of organized human labor (fishermen) and even government agencies 
would change their behaviors based on the decisions made by scallops seems 
shocking, yet our language itself resists thinking of clams as making decisions 
that shape human life. This is a failure of language rather than a failure in real-
ity… 
 Because of this, Callon and others developed a theory of actors and act-
ants in a network. Their work aimed to “translate” between the human and the 
non-human, or in more practical terms, to establish a generalized symmetry in 
discourse such that the human and non-human could be discussed using equal 
language that would avoid closing off our assumptions presumptively or inac-
curately. At the heart of ANT is this sense that “real” material relationships 
among things –  such as between clams, fishermen, and governments –  are also 
composed of “real” discourse or semiotic relationships. The concept of “gener-
alized symmetry” means that we, who are doing a scholarly study, had best avoid 
elevating or degrading different actors in a network using biased language, such 
as that which confers intentionality on humans and the absence of agency on 
the non-human (or even the non-living).  
 In part, this semiotic (language) shift is a way of addressing a long-rec-
ognized problem in Enlightenment philosophy. Again, in a simplified form, 
the Enlightenment regarded humans as rational creatures who, by exercising 
reason, are able to make self-determining choices. This is only one way of un-
derstanding humanity, but it has a deep influence and can accurately be seen as 
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underpinning modern democracy and several systems of law in the world today 
For humans, instinctual reactions are not choices, per se, and likewise decisions 
make while in a state of mental derangement are not rational, and hence we do 
not hold the rational and reasoning person responsible for these (or at least not 
to the same degree). This paradigm likewise alienates humanity from nature by 
privileging rationality and reason as the central elements of humanity: humans 
are understood as subjects making decisions about what to do to the world, and 
the world is understood as an object about which decisions are made that it can 
never understand. This is in the grammatical sense of the subject and object 
discussed in the previous week. “I hit the tree” has the subject “I” doing the verb 
“hitting” to the object “tree.” The natural temptation is then to divide humans 
from the world. Enlightenment philosophy has tended to alienate humans as 
subjects from the world as object, even though we are obvious a part of that 
object. ANT seeks to correct this by a semiotic change in how we discuss such 
problems –  no relationship among actors or actants (not subjects and objects) 
can be discussed without symmetrical discourse. “Symmetrical” means that our 
language should not grant nor bar agency from any actor in a network, nor 
should our language impose divisions between these actors. This allows us an 
enriched way of understanding the complex network of relationships among 
things as different as humans, governments, clams, and ecosystems without pre-
determining our results based on the language of our analysis. 
 Another standard example that adds to Callon’s scallops moves from the 
non-human living world to the products of the living world as well as non-
organic (or at least non-living) products. We might, for example, consider how 
networks among humans compare silk with nylon, the former having a deep 
attachment to the labor of silk worms and the latter being non-living. While 
we might compare human social hierarchies (silk is “upper class” while nylon is 
“working class,” in a simplified sense), we would in an ANT perspective also 
consider the silk itself or the nylon as part of the network of actors, as well as 
humans and silk worms. The same kind of argument is extended to lead or PVC 
plastics in plumbing (Mulder & Knot –). By refusing to give human 
actors a special or exalted position in our discourse/language, we may open our-
selves to a more nuanced understanding of the relationships involved as well as 
how we understand concepts such as agency, free will, and subjectivity. 
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
Please respond to any of these questions on the discussion board in WebCam-
pus. Remember, you have  point for your own comment and  point for re-
sponding to a classmate’s comment. This week, you will also have two class-
mates initiating discussion by posting a “Critical Summary” that excerpts a few 
sentences from Tolkien and a few sentences from Light. 
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. What does Light mean by the term “green time”? 
. What does the term “generalized symmetry” or “symmetrical discourse” 
mean in Actor-network Theory? 
. How are the ents or Tom Bombadil important to “green time”? 
. What is the difference between the ents as an allegory for the natural 
world versus the ents as speaking for the natural world? 
. Is Tolkien’s sense of the ecological world of special relevance today? If 
so, how, and if not, why? 
 
Works Cited & Supplemental Readings 
 
Callon, Michel. “Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestica-
tion of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay.” The Sociolog-
ical Review, vol. , no. , supplement, pp. –.  
https://tinyurl.com/yxkhypf3  
 
Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network The-
ory. Oxford UP, . https://tinyurl.com/yxmgca6f  
 
Latour, Bruno and Catherine Porter. Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sci-
ences into Democracy. Harvard UP, . https://tinyurl.com/y3beuvz6  
 
Light, Andrew. “Tolkien’s Green Time: Environmental Themes in The Lord 
of the Rings.” The Lord of the Rings & Philosophy, edited by Gregory 
Bassham and Eric Bronson, Open Court, , pp. –.  
https://tinyurl.com/y7qakgnr  
 
Mulder, Karel and Marjolijn Knot. “PVC Plastic: A History of Systems De-
velopment and Entrenchment.” Technology in Society, vol. , no. , 
, pp. –. https://tinyurl.com/yyukyzoj  
 
Tolkien, J.R.R. The Return of the King. Del Rey, . 

  







. Distinguish between the “non-human” and “Nature” as concepts. 
. Recognize the “land ethic” in The Lord of the Rings. 
. Describe the “land ethic” as an ethical approach to the non-human. 
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This week we complete The Return of the King and begin to ask the same ques-
tions that opened the course but with regard to different subjects. The previous 
week introduced us to “green time” and “Actor-network Theory” (ANT) as 
ways of discussing human contemplation of and interactions with the non-hu-
man world. Niiler’s approach to “green reading” extends these ideas to the rela-
tionship between the human and the non-human. Where ANT made us think 
about how our language shapes our understanding of the relations among the 
human and the non-human, Niiler begins to ask how the category of ethics 
relates to these interactions. If we accept a network of relations among actors or 
actants, and we seek “symmetrical discourse” that does not artificially divide 
humans from Nature, what does this mean for ethics? How do our categories 
of deontological, utilitarian, and virtue ethics relate to ecology? 
 
The Land Ethic 
 
Niiler’s argument about the “land ethic” derives from the conservationist and 
travel writer Aldo Leopold (–). His ideas may strike you as anticipat-
ing some of the concepts in Actor-network Theory (ANT) and later ecological 
movements we recognize today. By asking difficult questions, such as “thinking 
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like a mountain,” by which he meant including the non-human in questions of 
our relationship with land. The ideas also reflect a growing awareness of Indig-
enous stewardship of ecosystems and the widening recognition of indigeneity 
as rootedness in place.  
Glen Sean Coulthard has integrated the concept of locality and of indi-
geneity as “rootedness in place” with decolonization paradigms in Red Skin 
White Masks (), which draws its title from Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White 
Masks () and uses Fanon’s Sartre-influenced Marxist methodology. This 
means Coulthard’s critical frame relies on articulating the decolonization pro-
ject much like during the rapid decolonization of Africa at the mid-century. 
From Fanon, Coulthard specifically draws on chapters – of Marx’s Capital 
on primitive accumulation. However, Coulthard refocuses the argument to deal 
with indigeneity specifically as a relationship with or an ontology (a way of be-
ing) built out from land. While Fanon’s focus is on negotiating race through 
discourses of class (recall our discussions of a Marx in Week ), Coulthard 
extends the project to accommodate forms of subjectivity that are predicated on 
grounded concepts of indigeneity as belonging or rootedness in place. He also 
presents this rootedness in place as anti-capitalist and disruptive to the nation-
state.  
For indigeneity, Coulthard contends, via Vine Deloria Jr., that “one of 
the most significant differences that exist between Indigenous and Western 
metaphysics revolves around the central importance of land to Indigenous 
modes of being, thought, and ethics” (Coulthard ). Because of this, Indige-
nous populations, culture, literature, and resulting critical paradigms will privi-
lege place, locality, and embeddedness in place as an ontological framework. In 
contrast, the West differs insofar as colonial narratives “derive meaning from 
the world in historical/developmental terms, thereby placing time as the narra-
tive of central importance” (). Therefore, “place is a way of knowing, of expe-
riencing and relating to the world with others” (). This contrast between time 
and place is central. Hence, Indigenous forms of knowledge and ontology are 
always relational. As with Margaret Noodin’s Anishinaabe work, Coulthard ar-
ticulates this relational focus on place as also embedded in language. In Coul-
thard’s work, this language is Dogrib (Tłı̨chǫ, meaning “Dog Flank People”), 
and we may recall the importance of symmetrical discourse in our readings 
about ANT last week.  
Leopold’s work was rooted in the American Dream of a Manifest Des-
tiny, by which the expansion of the nation across the continent and the coloni-
zation of land was a deeply rooted part of the national identity. Instead, Leopold 
sought to rethink land as a part of relationship between the occupants (humans), 
the communities, and the nation as a whole. 
The challenge to Leopold’s view, which expands it in ways sympathetic 
to Coulthard’s sense of Indigenous identity, comes when Niiler compares him 
to Murray Bookchin (). Niller begins with the rhetorical question “Is nature, 
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in fact, all that is non-human?” and reasons the consequence of an affirmation 
as “the human race has a biblical ‘dominance’ over nature” (). However, 
Niiler quickly shifts this answer by adding the question “if nature is broadened 
or extended to include human beings, what then?” (). This, he argues, be-
comes a matter of ethics. 
 
The Ethics of Human & Non-human Relations in Nature 
 
If we give more detail to Niiler’s argument by our discussion of ANT the pre-
vious week, we are left with the alienation of humans from nature by an error 
in our language. We set humans as “subjects” doing things (verbs) to nature as 
an “object” (in the grammatical sense of these terms). This Enlightenment habit 
of mind alienated humans from nature. However, as Niiler points out, we are 
in fact part of the natural world, and our sense of being conscious subjects mak-
ing rational decisions exercising reason in order to act upon the world is itself 
troubled: we are often irrational and unreasonable, and many parts of the living 
world also exercise choice, although the non-living world is also (for ANT) an 
actor in this network of relationships.  
 If a symmetrical description of our relationships in this network can be 
offered, then what are the ethical dimensions of these relationships? In our 
opening example of the Ring of Gyges, we never asked about the ethics of the 
ring itself, although we may feel more tempted to consider Tolkien’s Ring as an 
active agent with unethical intentions. The ethical questions in Plato relate to 
the humans involved, and the non-human or even magical world of the ring 
have no involvement in ethics. In a grand sweep, we can use the thought exper-
iment of ethics if one were to be the last human in the world. Lying, for exam-
ple, may be unethical in our social world, but if all other people were gone, 
would lying remain unethical? What about theft or violence in a world without 
humans? As Niiler points out, either the natural world and ecology with which 
we interact (and of which we are a part) has an expectation of ethical interac-
tions from us, or it does not. As with our other questions of ethics, the conven-
ience or ease of an ethical choice is not a factor in considering what is or is not 
ethical. We may be tempted to consider this as the domain of virtue ethics, that 
such decisions reflect us as subjects and our innermost being, but Niiler offers 
the concept of “land-autonomy” as a lever out of this conundrum. 
 Niller offers land-autonomy as the view that humans and the natural 
world should be separate, with nature “left to care and fend for itself, and that, 
in fact, any and all form of human (or hobbit) agency constitutes an unwanted, 
unwarranted intrusion” (). His argument is that where this is a starting point 
in human/non-human relations in The Lord of the Rings, the books grow to-
wards a “land ethic” akin to Leopold’s views: “the Ents re-create –  recover –  a 
fresh possibility of better future stewardship of nature” (). For Niiler, then, 
“it is possible to trace in The Lord of the Rings the growth of a land ethic –  a 
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move from land-appropriation to land-husbandry” (), and even more force-
fully that the human world cannot succeed without an ethical relationship 
among the human and non-human worlds since “the Shire’s democracy crum-
bles without the existence of free land” (). Marx may lead us to question the 
democracy of the Shire, but the pressure toward a symmetrical and ethical rela-
tionship has much merit in Tolkien’s and our worlds. This reminds us of the 
struggles around the Shire that close The Return of the King just as much as it 
makes us recall Tom Bombadil from The Fellowhsip of the Ring at the start of 
the books. Both the recovery of the Shire and Tom Bombadil’s early model of 
ethical relations with the world remind us that “he [Tom] is, in part, an indict-
ment of a materialistic culture that has forgotten its ethical obligation toward 
land” (). As his talk shifts from nature to culture and the language of “king-
doms” and “victory,” he charts a failure to find ethical balance among the actors 
in the network of the natural world.   
 Our challenge as readers is to marshal our ethical discussions from ear-
lier in the course to address this problem of ecology and the human, non-hu-
man, and also non-living world. Do we bear ethical responsibility to other non-
human things, and do these ethical obligations (if we agree to them) extend 
from living things to non-living things? Is consciousness the only arbiter of our 
ethical obligations, such that we may have a duty of care to gorillas or ravens 
but not to trees or forests? If we do have an ethical relationship with living 
things, must this also extend to the non-living world? Is our sense of our ethical 
responsibilities based on a concept of virtue ethics, which means it only has to 
do with ourselves and our own personal betterment, or does ethics reflect doing 
things that are intrinsically good or that bring happiness to the greatest num-
bers? If we accept a deontological ethics and see right action as itself ethical by 
definition, then the distinction between the human and non-human would 
seem unimportant since it is the action itself we must consider. If instead we 
accept a utilitarian ethics, then how do we balance the greatest happiness for 
humans against the happiness (or harm) brought to other living things, some of 
which show the capacity for forms of consciousness, and many of which show 
a very real capacity to suffer and experience pain? More difficult still, how do 
we extend these thoughts to a full ecological system that is complex and diffi-
culty for us to conceptualize as a totality, just as it is difficult for us to concep-
tualize a society or culture as composed of individuals? 
 In Tolkien, much attention is given to the Shire as a part of the natural 
world that seek harmony or that balances a way of life between tradition and 
increasing industrialization. Much has been made by scholars of the “return to 
the shires” movement after World War II in Britain, by which they mean a 
literary and cultural shift to value traditional rural life that was being lost due to 
modernization. This can be a consequence of nostalgia and can even be politi-
cally reactionary (seeking a return to a less democratic and less free world, more 
aristocratic in its social structure), but it can also be regarded as a longing for 
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nature. However, our attention must include not only the good world of the 
Shire but also the fallen world of Mount Doom and the non-human species 
such as Orcs or the peculiar force in the Ring. If we regard the climax of The 
Return of the King as a conflict between Frodo and Gollum, we lose the im-
portance of the Ring’s influence over both of them. Likewise, we lose the inter-
nal conflict between Gollum and Smeagol. But what of the Ring as an actant 
in this network of relations? Has it not precipitated the entirety of four novels 
around itself? If we do not consider it a protagonist, what have we lost? And 
must Mount Doom itself remain an object alone, even though its fire destroys 
the Ring? If our language and form of discourse cast the mountain as only an 
object without any active agency, how do we understand it as the grammatical 
subject that destroys the Ring? 
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
Please respond to any of these questions on the discussion board in WebCam-
pus. Remember, you have  point for your own comment and  point for re-
sponding to a classmate’s comment. This week, you will have two classmates 
initiating discussion by posting a “Critical Summary” that excerpts a few sen-
tences from Tolkien and a few sentences from Niiler. 
 
. How are the human and the non-human a subset of “nature”? 
. Do virtue ethics include one’s actions to the non-human? 
. In a utilitarian paradigm, how could one weight the balance between 
human and non-human happiness and suffering? 
. Do deontological ethics include actions (or inactions) toward the non-
human? 
. What does it mean to be ontologically rooted in place rather than time? 
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. Recognize intentional and incidental learning through the course, class 
discussions, and personal readings. 
. Identify instances of ethics, social hierarchy, purpose, and ecology from 
The Lord of the Rings. 
. Identify instances of ethics, social hierarchy, purpose, and ecology in 
your own life. 
. Discuss how ethics, social organization, and ecology contribute (or fail 








This week is dedicated to review and catching up any missed readings. We have 
only Monday before the reading days dedicated to missed classes and your own 
review followed by the beginning of the examination period.  
 
“Here at the end of all things” 
 
Like so many of Tolkien’s key phrases, “Here at the end of all things, Sam” 
repeats in The Return of the King (, ). We have it the first time as “‘I am 
glad you are with me here. Here at the end of all things, Sam’” () and again 
slightly modified as “‘I am glad that you are here with me,’ said Frodo. ‘Here at 
the end of all things, Sam’” (). Both Thomas Kullmann () and Devin 
Brown () notice this repetition, and Kullmann links it to larger intertextual 
structures across the books that occur through precisely these kinds of repeti-
tions. Recall our discussion of this as the beginning as well. Our work in the 
course has focused on close readings, being attentive to how our attention is 
guided to informational and inferential approaches to the text, ethics, theology, 
our sense of purpose in life, and finally how we fit within our world. Now that 
we are all here at the end of all things, or at least at the end of all things in this 
course, we have a chance to reflect on our experiences and our fellowship, as 
Sam and Frodo do across this scene in the book. 
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 For your own experiences, there are intentional learning outcomes in 
any course of studies, as well as incidental learning outcomes. The intentional 
components are listed as objectives in each week of the Study Guide. You may 
wish to review these as preparation for the final examination. However, just as 
I have other unstated learning objectives for you, ones that are often easier to 
approach through a side-door or while you are not consciously thinking of them 
as a goal, you also surely have unexpected or unintended learning as well. Some 
of this may come from readings outside of those assigned (such as secondary 
works from the Annotated Bibliography assignment), but they may also be from 
ancillary components of our readings. Please take time in the Discussion Board 
(ungraded this week) to share what you have learned or to pose questions to 
your classmates. 
 
Viva Voce Final Examination 
 
The final examination for this course will be conducted as a “viva voce” (inter-
view) online through Skype, telephone, Blackboard Collaborate (the video con-
ferencing system built into WebCampus), or other audio or video communica-
tions. Students must have access to either a telephone or computer system that 
supports audio/video conferencing or such technology. Three questions will 
comprise the examination:  
 
. an oral defense of your final essay based on a challenge or query given 
by the instructor, 
. discussing your final essay’s topic or approach in relation to a different 
text or paradigm provided during the exam by the instructor, and  
. a comparison of two course readings suggested by the instructor. 
 
Evaluation of your performance in the examination is based on three criteria 
ranked in order of importance:  
 
. demonstrated completion of the course of studies, 
. demonstrated understanding of the critical concepts of the course, and  
. the capacity for creative or innovative thought 
 
More succinctly, the exam will test if students completed the course and 
achieved a reasonable level of comprehension of the materials. If you find that 
you are unable to answer a particular question, you will be offered alternatives 
until you are able to demonstrate what things you have learned, although there 
may be deductions for each question left unanswered. This means that the viva 
voce examinations are both rigorous and generous. They are rigorous because 
they show very quickly what work has been done and what work has not, but 
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they are generous because you are always able to demonstrate what you have 
learned and ensure that your learning does contribute to your final grade.  
 
Questions for Self-Review 
 
You may ask any questions in the Discussion Board, both for the instructor or 
for classmates. Please use the venue as a place to reflect on your learning across 
the semester or to pose questions about the examination and future studies. You 
may wish to use the “Objectives” above as a guide for your self-review. 
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